1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 18

  The beneficiaries of these conflicts were Bush and Kohl. Neither the president nor the chancellor wanted to indulge in creating vast new institutions, and neither was willing to sit back while others tried to produce a third way in everything from property rights to international security. As a saying making the rounds among West German businesses at the time put it, the third way would lead to the third world. In their view, that could not be allowed to happen in a united Germany.124

  CHAPTER 4

  PREFAB PREVAILS

  What kinds of inner joy does politics have to offer …? Well, first of all, it confers a feeling of power. The professional politician can have a sense of rising above everyday existence … from the knowledge that he holds in his hands some vital strand of historically important events. But the question facing such a person is which qualities will enable him to do justice to this power….

  —Max Weber, 1919

  Prefabrication: Manufacture of parts or all of a building in a factory before they or it are brought to the site.

  —The Oxford Dictionary of Architecture, 1999

  So many people, with so many different views and so many different voices. And inside each of us so many more people still, all struggling to be heard. For a moment one voice rises above the others, and everyone picks up the tune. And then the cacophony resumes.

  —Lines delivered by playwright Michael Frayn’s version of Brandt, in Democracy, 20031

  On March 18, East Germans would have their first opportunity since the dawn of the Nazi era to cast their ballots freely. Roughly twelve million voters would choose among twenty-four parties. As their choices would highlight, these new voters were not persuaded by the dissidents and former dictators (who had become uneasy allies at the round table) that there was a future for an independent GDR. The idea of a revived East Germany, heroically blazing the trail for a new kind of socialism and property pluralism, seemed like too big of a risk. Kohl was confident that his party, the CDU, could offer the voters something that would appeal to them more: institutional transfer, or the chance to install preexisting Western institutions and laws on to East German territory as soon as possible.2 Militarily, NATO would provide a sufficient security umbrella; politically, new East German states could simply import the West German Basic Law; and economically, the West German currency and market rules would do fine. Since all of these institutions and structures were prefabricated, and (in Kohl’s view) ready for set up in the East without much subsequent alteration, unification could proceed rapidly indeed. The chancellor believed that the West German faith in corporatism—defined as the establishment and use of institutional mechanisms to resolve conflicts among different segments of society—was not misplaced, and would transfer well to the East.3 Moreover, it would be to Kohl’s advantage to proceed swiftly with his prefab plans, because it would ensure that the process took place while Gorbachev was still in power, and it would prevent critics from trying to suggest changes. In short, Kohl knew that the campaign in the GDR was a vital strand in historically important events, both domestically and internationally, and that he could potentially dominate it even though he was not officially on the ballot.

  The German theorist Max Weber had argued in 1919 that what mattered was whether a politician had the qualities to do justice to such a historic opportunity. Kohl’s opponents, ranging from the dissidents in East Berlin to the SPD in Bonn, felt that he did not, particularly when he began invoking the Stalinist era at a key moment. As will be described below, they campaigned hard against what they saw as a developing tragedy—namely, a CDU victory and the concomitant loss of a chance to create a third way. Kohl’s opponents simply did not believe that he and his party colleagues in the East would be willing or able to live up to the opportunity to create a new Germany, and perhaps a new Europe.

  These events mattered to more than just Germans because, in early 1990, international relations would become tied tightly to German domestic politics.4 Kohl was betting that if he could win at home, then he could win abroad, and his friends and enemies had to wait and see whether he was right. A big victory on March 18 would provide his prefab model with so much domestic legitimacy that he would be difficult to challenge on the international level.

  As a result, Kohl decided that he should do absolutely whatever it took to emerge victorious in East Germany, even if that meant offending other countries in the short term. The former U.S. secretary of state, Dean Acheson, used to say that 80 percent of the job of making foreign policy was managing one’s domestic ability to have a policy at all.5 For Kohl in March 1990, even though he was not officially on the ballot in the GDR, it became close to 100 percent of his job. And if he did win big, there would be an added bonus: he could claim to his international partners that the desires of East German voters, and not he himself, drove the process.

  THE SECURITY SOLUTION: TWO PLUS FOUR EQUALS NATO

  Kohl got off to a good start in his campaign, thanks to Gorbachev’s agreement that German unity was a matter for Germans alone to decide. This success, secured over the weekend of February 10–11 in Moscow, was multiplied by events in the days immediately following. On the day that Kohl left Moscow, TASS released a Soviet government pledge to “secure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other people’s territories in Europe by 1995–96 and the elimination of all military bases on foreign territories by the year 2000.” 6 Then, through their foreign ministers, he and Bush began to go on the offensive together at the Ottawa conference of February 11–13.

  This conference, which brought together the foreign ministers of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to discuss international aviation, could not have been better timed for the purpose of German unification. It meant that the foreign ministers of all significant states were in one place and allowed them to hold conversations at a tempo otherwise unimaginable. Baker, who was still on the continuous road trip that had started February 5, managed in just one day (February 13) to speak at least five times each to both Genscher and Shevardnadze, meet with Hurd and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, and hold a NATO ministerial caucus, all while carrying out the scheduled program on aviation.7 In the course of one of these meetings, Shevardnadze finally accepted Bush’s proposal for a mutual 195,000 limit on ground and air personnel in the central zone of Europe. The Soviet foreign minister, changing a previous position, did not demand that the United States give up the troops outside that zone as well.8

  Even though neither Bush nor Kohl was in Ottawa, they were still directing events via phone calls to the conference and each other. Kohl called Bush on Tuesday, February 13, at 7:45 p.m. German time.9 It was his first conversation with the U.S. president since his historic meeting with Gorbachev the previous Saturday. The lack of word from Kohl for three days afterward had made Scowcroft concerned. “We had done the most we could to encourage our preferred outcome,” he remembered, including sending the presidential letter to Bonn on the night before Kohl’s departure. But, Scowcroft added, despite this precaution, “we were more than a little nervous. We had great faith in Kohl, but Gorbachev might decide to push hard. We could not rule out the possibility that Gorbachev could tempt—or threaten—him.” 10 Kohl’s February 10 conversation with Gorbachev had reminded Scowcroft of what he already knew: that there was a version of the future that involved only Bonn and Moscow as the decision-making centers, not necessarily Washington.11 Indeed, Falin advised Gorbachev around this time to offer “very attractive” proposals to both Germanies—calling for the establishment of a “neutral, democratic, and basically demilitarized Germany”—against which the three Western powers could do little. Falin also thought that the Soviet Union could win the support of Britain and France for such an idea.12

  Scowcroft and Bush were reassured, however, by Kohl’s February 13 call. The chancellor told Bush that “the neutralization of Germany is out of the question for me.” Kohl was hopeful that he could avoid that issue and still attain unity. “I feel we will find a solution” to the outstanding pro
blems, Kohl said, “but it will be hard work.” “We must find a solution,” Bush agreed.13

  Bush subsequently spoke to Baker to find out how one possible solution, the 2 + 4 forum, was faring in his conversations in Ottawa. What he heard from Baker was not satisfying. Shevardnadze was insisting that 2 + 4 meetings begin even before the elections on March 18—something that Baker opposed. Genscher, using Baker’s hotel room phone, called Kohl to see what he thought; Kohl agreed to the Soviet demand, and Genscher informed Baker.

  Some interesting personal politics ensued. On hearing this, Bush and his White House team insisted on calling Kohl personally. They did not trust Genscher, whom they saw as willing to give anything to the Soviets for unity. Embarrassingly for Genscher, even though he had phoned Kohl in Baker’s hotel suite with Baker there, he had to wait while Bush tested his veracity. In his memoirs, Genscher recalled that this was the only time this happened to him in his sixteen years as foreign minister to that date. Baker looked uncomfortable, but they both made the best of it, passing the time with small talk.14 Genscher told a story that showed there was at least one place that trusted him: the town where he was born, now in East Germany. On Friday, he would attend a ceremony at which his old high school would be named after him.

  In the Oval Office, Bush felt compelled to explain to Kohl why he was calling Bonn again at 9:01 p.m. German time when they had already spoken that day: “I don’t want to get crosswise with you, and I am talking about Helmut Kohl as well as the FRG,” explained the president. “I don’t want to get caught up in internal matters.” Kohl replied, “I understand that well.” He assured Bush that, yes, he had spoken to Genscher and, yes, what Genscher had said was right. The importance of getting started with 2 + 4 outweighed all other concerns. “I want to be frank,” Kohl said. “I worry if this question remains open.” If it did, “others in the East and the West [will] want to join up with the Four. Then we will have a big problem.” Although he did not mention it particularly, Kohl was worried about Poland. Bush saw the point; he found the idea of involving as many as thirty-five nations of the CSCE to be a “non-starter.” 15 Kohl also pointed out that it would be May before an East German coalition government could form itself after the multiparty elections, so nothing would really happen until then anyway. He reassured Bush: “That gives the two of us enough time.” 16 Time to do what was not specified, but presumably map out the plan for the future before others could do so. In other words, it did not matter when the 2 + 4 meetings began, because 2 + 4 did not really matter. Bush and Kohl would sort out the important decisions between themselves. Still, they needed to be seen publicly endorsing a forum in which the other countries could at least feel they were being heard. Such a forum was necessary not only for the Soviet Union. As Thatcher would explain to Genscher when he stopped in England on his way home from Ottawa, “Germany’s allies … [are] feeling ignored or excluded.” 17

  Bush, now having the express permission of the chancellor, said that he would authorize Baker to go ahead. He hung up at 3:10 p.m. Washington time and, according to Baker’s memoirs, was ringing the phone in the Ottawa hotel room five minutes later, giving Baker the green light. Genscher had passed his humiliating test and decided to swallow his anger, realizing that the origin of the distrust lay not in Washington but in Bonn.18

  Ironically, it seems that Baker may have received the same questioning himself around the same time. Baker’s delegation member Ross remembered that the West Germans had worries of their own as to whether Baker was freelancing. If so, this may have been due to the discrepancies between the letters Kohl had received from Baker and Bush on February 9 and 10. Bonn appears to have doublechecked whether or not Baker still enjoyed Bush’s confidence and received a positive reply.19

  Once everything was settled, Baker and Genscher sprang into action. “Having finally received a clear green light from our capitals, Genscher and I decided to go ahead and issue the Two-plus-Four statement. We didn’t want to give anyone time for any more second thoughts.” Using the method of locking in an agreement by publicizing it immediately, they got the British and French foreign ministers to agree to a short-notice press conference. Their written release announced that the two Germanies and four powers had agreed to meet “to discuss the external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the issues of the security of the neighboring states.” Events had moved so quickly that other NATO members present at the same conference did not even know that 2 + 4 was final; Baker remembers that they were irritated to learn from journalists what had happened.20

  Baker and Genscher were right to move quickly; back home in Moscow, Gorbachev’s opponents were trying to shoot down the idea of 2 + 4. Chernyaev remembers that Shevardnadze’s willingness to agree to it was viewed in the Soviet Union as a sign of weakness and a capitulation.21 Gorbachev’s opponents thought that it should at the very least be named 4 + 2, since the four powers had defeated Germany. A month later, Gorbachev would have to defend himself against the rumors that Baker’s delegation members were going around proclaiming that in Ottawa, as in the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets blinked first. Gorbachev was so upset by this that Baker felt it necessary to write him a personal note saying that any such remarks were unauthorized.22 This exchange altered nothing, however; the deal was done. Baker knew, as Kohl did, that once an agreement was in writing and released to the press, it was hard to undo. Publicized written agreements, not private gentleman’s agreements, were the way of the world in 1990.

  There was no rest for Baker and his delegation members when they finally returned to Washington after the eventful eight-day trip to Europe and Canada. Although they had succeeded in selling their ideas about NATO and 2 + 4 abroad, they still had to sell them back home. At a State Department background briefing after his trip, run by Margaret Tutwiler, a journalist asked if someone could “talk a little bit about how you see this shaking down. If both sides get to 195 [thousand troops in the central zone of Europe] do the 195 Soviet troops stay in an otherwise demilitarized East Germany that is part of a unified Germany that is part of NATO? That sounds a little surreal to most of us.” The answer: “I know. But German unification used to sound surreal to a lot of people too.” 23

  The notion of an East German region with Soviet troops but without NATO still sounded surreal to the NSC as well. Scowcroft in particular was worried about Baker’s pledge that NATO’s jurisdiction would not move one inch eastward, because it could interfere with German unification. Acquiring an indefensible territory would simply not be a viable solution for a united Germany, so Scowcroft and Teltschik discussed how to deal with Baker when they saw each other at the annual Munich international defense conference, called Wehrkunde, held every year in February. If the Soviet Union could in fact get guarantees that NATO would never expand, then it could stall or prevent unification. Trying to undo some of the damage that the NSC thought Baker had done, staff member Rice (who went to Moscow with the secretary and then faced a barrage of questions about why she had not stopped Baker when she got back) had a conversation with Vadim Zagladin. She emphasized to Zagladin, who worked in the Communist Party’s own de facto foreign ministry, the International Department of the Central Committee, that membership of united Germany in NATO was extremely important to the United States.24

  Meanwhile, similar concerns arose in both London and Bonn. Thatcher thought it essential that all of Germany have full membership of NATO. The only feasible concession would be for “NATO to forswear the deployment of non-German forces in the former GDR” which would, as will be described in the next chapter, eventually emerge as the answer. Her briefing papers on the topic indicate concern that the Russians would also demand “that no nuclear weapons be present on German soil” which could lead to the “de-nuclearisation of Europe.” If the Soviets were to do so, “the bulk of German public opinion is likely to be sympathetic,” particularly influential church leaders in East Germany who had “already taken a strong stand on the issue.” As a r
esult, Western leaders would have to handle this issue very carefully if they hoped to maintain their nuclear deterrent in a united Germany. At the same time, in West Germany, Defense Minister Stoltenberg and Bundeswehr General Klaus Naumann continued to share Scowcroft’s doubts. They wondered how an East Germany outside of NATO could possibly be defended. At a meeting of a chancellery team assembled to plan for unity, Genscher pushed back against Stoltenberg. The foreign minister insisted that a way would have to be found to defend the GDR, because moving NATO to East Germany would meet with “opposition from all sides.” The dispute spilled out into the open and Kohl had to intervene. In the short run, he supported Genscher’s view, since it agreed with what he had told Gorbachev; but the issue of defending East Germany was clearly still unresolved.25

  The outcome of the similar standoff in Washington was the opposite. Zelikow remembers that Baker had to “walk back from his February position” because it was simply untenable.26 The secretary of state ceased using his line about NATO not moving eastward after February 1990. He also had to defend the 2 + 4 forum. This forum had become a reality much faster than anyone had expected and without serious NSC discussion of it. Scowcroft would later remark that it was his fault for not scheduling a discussion, “but I had thought that Baker was only taking soundings among the allies” and the NSC would have a chance to vet the idea later, once Baker got back from his trip.27 Scowcroft and his staff were afraid that the 2 + 4 mechanism was both too weak and too strong. Too weak because, as Rice noted, Gorbachev could “dillute [sic] the 2 + 4 process” with his preference for “‘all-Europeaness.” 28 It might also be too strong, because it would give the Soviet Union another means of obstructing unity.