1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 20
THE ECONOMIC SOLUTION: MONETARY UNION
To prove that the use of Article 23 would be voluntary, Kohl had to get people to vote for his party, which decided to endorse it as the path to unity. With so much resting on the March 18 elections, Kohl decided that he could not simply leave campaigning to inexperienced East German CDU leaders, tainted by years of cooperation with the ruling regime. He mobilized numerous West German members of the CDU to go to the East to help with the elections, and was pleased when the effort brought new vigor to the Western party as well.57
More importantly, as mentioned already, he forged an East German election block called the Alliance for Germany. Kohl did so even though he was not personally on the ballot. Rather, he decided after some hesitation to cooperate with the East German CDU leader Lothar de Maizière, a relatively minor figure in GDR politics who had studied music before pursuing a career in politics. De Maizière had emerged as head of the eastern CDU in the chaos of November 1989, when the Eastern party ended its long practice of rubber-stamping all SED decisions. He came from a suitably symbolic family; originally of French origin, it had prominent branches in West Germany as well. His uncle Ulrich de Maizière had even served as the inspector general of the Bundeswehr, and Ulrich’s son Thomas, already active in CDU politics in 1990, would eventually become the head of the chancellery for Merkel in a united Germany. As a result, Lothar seemed like an appropriate enough figurehead for the East German CDU, in spite of the fact that he had been a member when it had tainted itself by submission to the SED, because he had a background suggesting the possibility for cooperation across borders. De Maizière, as it would turn out, would come into conflict with Bonn on a number of crucial issues (and ultimately fall under suspicion of having worked too closely with the Stasi); but in the spring of that year, he seemed like a safe enough ally. The West German and East German branches of the SPD had entered into a cooperative agreement in mid-January, and several former dissident groups had also followed suit and formed their own electoral alliances, so Kohl clearly felt that he needed to set up what at least looked like East-West cooperation between the two halves of the CDU as well. Ultimately, two dozen parties and various alliances would compete for the votes of 12.2 million newly enfranchised East Germans.58
On February 6, also mentioned previously, Kohl launched the Alliance for Germany’s not-so-secret weapon: he began promising to try to achieve an economic and monetary union between the two Germanies—a vow sure to appeal to voters. This was a political decision, made without consultation with central bankers and without an assessment of what it might do to other European currencies. By February 20, after receiving Gorbachev’s permission, he simply instructed a commission of experts to figure out how to make such a union work.59 The cornerstone of it would be the introduction of the DM as the legal currency of East Germany as soon as possible, even before any kind of political unification.
The election platform of the Alliance for Germany, once finalized, called for a transition to the DM at an exchange rate of one to one for at least some of the amount switched over. This exchange rate was significantly higher than the actual black market rate for changing East German marks into West German DM, and the source of opposition in the Bundesbank, but that did not matter politically. As mentioned, East German crowds had started chanting, “if the DM doesn’t come to us, we will go to it.” Kohl intended to prevent that from happening.60
Monetary union had an additional advantage for Kohl, although he would only describe it privately at first: he thought that it would be an indirect but effective way to get rid of Soviet troops. His aide Teltschik had already started looking into legal means to ask the Soviets to leave, and had been heartened to discover that the Soviet Union had signed a “temporary” agreement on troop stationing with the GDR in 1957. Though the de facto practice clearly diverged from the de jure agreement—thirty-three years later, the troops were still there—the legal documents nonetheless stated that their presence in East Germany was “temporary.” A united Germany therefore would have a legal leg to stand on, if it were to call for the Soviet Union to bring the “temporary” stationing to a close.61
But such legal arguments might not be enough. Given this, Kohl felt that the introduction of the DM might help too. Soon, he reasoned, the economy in East Germany would blossom and provide an array of high-quality consumer goods. Kohl told Gorbachev that once the Soviet troops stationed in the GDR started to see such goods, which they could presumably not afford because they would still hold rubels, they would grow resentful, and cause problems both in Germany and for Moscow. Gorbachev would want to pull them out as a result, because their behavior might otherwise embarrass the Soviet Union.
Kohl’s idea was not idle speculation; problems with black marketeering had already arisen elsewhere. The fifty thousand Soviet troops and three divisions in Hungary, and the seventy-five thousand troops and five army divisions in Czechoslovakia, scheduled to withdraw in 1991, were already causing trouble by selling their weapons and other equipment for hard currency.62 As Kohl explained to Mitterrand over breakfast during one of their many meetings that spring, Moscow had agreed to pull them out of Eastern Europe so quickly because “discipline had dissolved.” Soldiers had destroyed barracks, ripped out telephone lines, blown up ammunition, and created an environmental disaster by dumping oil and other noxious supplies. “They were selling weapons and equipment up to and including tanks.” On top of this, “the number of deserters was enormous, especially once the borders opened.” Kohl felt strongly that the impact of consumer goods on troops was enormous regardless of their nationality. He pointed out that even U.S. troops in West Germany had something of a “ghetto psychology” because of their insistence on clustering around base stores carrying familiar consumer goods priced in dollars, rather than interacting with the local economy.63
Kohl thought that Moscow had pulled out quickly elsewhere because of rampant black marketeering, and felt certain that it would do so in East Germany as well.64 What the chancellor did not realize at this time was that the Soviet troops had an effective counter. Collectively, they had saved a large amount of East German marks in a so-called “field bank,” and they would soon demand the ability to transfer those to DM as well. When he became aware of it, Kohl would find this demand costly, but hard to resist. In the short run, however, Kohl did not know about these troop savings, and he was certain of both the power of consumer goods, and that the proposal of rapid economic and monetary union would be a vote-getter. Although he was not a candidate, he chose to deliver this campaign message personally to East German voters nonetheless. There was a great deal that was unclear about how the elections should proceed—as late as February 20, there was not yet a new election law in the GDR—and the chancellor decided to take advantage of the uncertainty about the role of Western parties to jump into the fray.65
The East German round table tried to resist this decision by Kohl and others, passing a resolution against election speakers coming from the West to campaign in the East. The resolution had little effect, though, as the major Western parties simply ignored it. This display of impotence further undermined the authority of the round table. Letter writers wrote in to complain that their government was asking for fifteen billion DM in aid from Kohl at the same time it was telling him that he was not welcome to give so much as a speech. Some letter writers did support the round table, but many could not understand why it had passed the resolution. For its part, the West German newspaper Bild began to picture East Germans as ungrateful—a trend that would continue: “Here We Go Again: GDR Forbids Speeches by Brandt and Kohl,” read one headline.66
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE WAYS OF THE WARD HEELER
Kohl dove into the campaign on February 20 in Erfurt, with the first of what would eventually be six rallies in the East. As he explained on the phone to Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, he had never seen a turnout like the one in Erfurt. In a city with a total population of 200,000, an estima
ted 150,000 had found their way to the plaza in front of the cathedral by the 5:00 p.m. start of the event.67 Kohl’s speech emphasized the social welfare side of the West German market economy, assuring the crowd that even after having DM in their hands, they would still have a safety net. Teltschik remembered an enormous amount of applause at the end of the speech.68
The chancellor’s next appearance, on March 2, was successful as well, but there was a cloud over the event. The crowds were still large and enthusiastic—200,000 people in Chemnitz—but Kohl’s message was overshadowed by increasing international calls for some kind of new guarantee of the Polish border. Kohl was still unwilling to create one. Border recognition, he said in public, would only occur if linked to Polish renunciation of any further reparations and guarantees of the rights of ethnic Germans in Poland.69 Moreover, it would happen only after unification, not before, as Warsaw wished. Kohl insisted it had to be after, because he felt that the current West German government could not speak for the future united Germany, and could not sign treaties in its name. Legal scholars questioned this assertion, saying that, under Article 23, East Germany would simply join the existing state of West Germany and leave all of the FRG’s treaties intact anyway, including any that might be made with Poland.
Kohl’s opinion remained firm, however; no treaty until after unification.70 Teltschik recalled that Kohl wanted to make sure not only that he won the election, but that a clear majority in both the Bundestag and the Volkskammer would support the legal measures that would follow. It would be much harder to unify the country if a third of the Bundestag voted against it because of objections to accords with Poland.
Teltschik, who was researching the issue at Kohl’s request at this time, unearthed some useful, if unfortunate, history. In two agreements from the 1950s, earlier Polish governments had agreed in writing to a cap on, and subsequently the elimination of, reparations from Germany. The chancellor decided to emphasize this information publicly, despite the fact that both agreements lacked any kind of democratic legitimization.71 Kohl’s willingness to rest his own arguments on Stalin era accords proved just how high the stakes were.
In a move that made the realities of 1990 plain, the chancellor had a controversial parliamentary resolution drafted. The resolution promised, on the one hand, a joint statement by the Bundestag and the soon-to-be elected East German Volkskammer to the effect that Polish borders would not be violated, in keeping with the terms of the Warsaw Treaty. On the other hand, the resolution underscored that there would be no further reparations, citing one of the two agreements from the 1950s specifically as the reason.72
The response was swift. The press was highly critical. Poland pushed back and said that the 1950s accords did not apply to individuals who had suffered under the Nazis, particularly in concentration camps; those victims retained the right to petition individually for redress.73 Gorbachev, in an interview, expressed disapproval, and said categorically that German membership in NATO was “absolutely ruled out.” 74 Genscher distanced himself from Kohl’s remarks. Opponents could not believe that Kohl would talk about Stalin era treaties in the same breath as the FRG’s own democratically ratified Warsaw Treaty.75 Kohl had to defend himself to his allies in a Bundestag debate on the resolution. The criticism was so intense that Teltschik was surprised Kohl did not retreat. The chancellor was pulling out all the stops to win the election at home, regardless of the reaction abroad. It had presumably not escaped Kohl’s notice that the first free elections in the Soviet Union, held the same day as the March 2 rally in Chemnitz, had given a large majority to the nationalists in Lithuania. Let outsiders complain that he was being too nationalistic; he had an election to win.
Kohl emerged victoriously from the parliamentary debate; the Bundestag adopted his resolution, including its point about reparations, by a large majority.76 He also carried out a successful visit to Brussels, where he defended his actions to his NATO allies. Privately, he complained to Teltschik about how effective the Poles were in finding allies abroad to support their cause; they were “world champions in winning sympathy.” 77
Kohl had won that round, but he had made both his enemies and friends nervous. The leader of the SPD in East Germany, Ibrahim Böhme, reassured Shevardnadze that he would behave much more sensibly once the SPD was in charge there. Böhme agreed completely with Moscow’s view that the process of unification should only happen once new European structures, especially a new security alliance, had been erected. Shevardnadze was pleased to hear that the East German SPD would resist rapid unification and immediate NATO membership. The Soviet foreign minister pointed out that in trying to block those events, the Soviet Union was not without leverage: it supplied East Germany with its gas and oil, after all.78 Similarly, Gerd Poppe, now a candidate himself, traveled to Moscow to complain to Gorbachev about the election conduct of the West German parties. Their interference was leading to a “new destabilization.” In an ironic twist of fate, the former dissident was now calling on the leader of the Soviet Union for help. Poppe argued that Gorbachev should press harder for his plan of new pan-European structures, which the Soviet leader did in a lengthy Pravda interview the next day.79
As for Kohl’s allies, they were not entirely happy either. Mitterrand, whom the chancellor regarded as a close friend, was particularly upset by Kohl’s election campaign. He disagreed vehemently with Kohl about Poland. Mitterrand was about to host Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki for a state visit; during it, the three of them would publicly belittle the Bundestag resolution. They criticized it as not clear enough, and argued that some kind of “international juridical act” was needed.80 In a series of conversations with Kohl both before and after the Polish visit, Mitterrand tried to get the German chancellor to be more accommodating, pointing out that “France could not stay silent” on the border issue.81 The French leader was also upset by what he viewed as disrespectful actions toward his troops stationed in West Germany.82 In an effort to remind the public that France still had a say, Mitterrand ordered a military parade in West Berlin in late February 1990, but was subsequently horrified when Berliners pushed back and asked for the parade to be canceled.83
As a consequence of all of these issues, a massive argument erupted just a few days before the election between the chancellor and the president. Kohl was furious that Mitterrand would cast doubt on the sincerity of a resolution approved by the democratically elected West German parliament. The chancellor could not understand why the Poles were publicly demanding treaty negotiations with the West Germans before even officially contacting Bonn about it. Kohl pointedly told Mitterrand that he was trying to achieve both German and European unity, and was willing to make big strides on monetary union within the year as a result, but was getting very little credit for what he was doing. Mitterrand responded by insisting that the Poles needed to be heard at the 2 + 4 talks. Kohl conceded somewhat, allowing the 2 + 4 at least to invite the Poles to attend a session. Although it was rough going, in hindsight Kohl remembered this phone call as the storm that finally cleared the air between friends.84 The chancellor had been trying to say to his alliance partners, in so many words, let me do whatever I need to win the election at home, and then we will sort everything out abroad. After the middle of March, Mitterrand decided to give him the space to do so.
Washington kept a close eye on the election as well. In the final week before voting, a member of Baker’s policy planning staff, Sicherman, composed a synopsis of the East German election and its potential impact on U.S. policy. Since this summary contained prescient speculation about the future course of events in Europe, it is worth examining in detail. Sicherman delivered this memo on March 12 to both Ross and Zoellick, who in turn passed it on to the secretary; Baker saved it among his personal papers when he left office. In it, Sicherman expressed surprise at the “absence of German political unity over unification”; he found that “if the politicians are divided, thus far the GDR population is not.” East Germans clearly wanted unification,
even if the West Germans were ambivalent about it. “Kohl, who has the ambition to be a historic figure but the ways of a ward heeler has had his finger intermittently on this very pulse.” By this, Sicherman meant that the chancellor’s heart was in domestic affairs and the give-and-take between local political machines within his country. Kohl was trying to use those skills on a bigger stage, albeit awkwardly. Hence, “he had aligned himself, sometimes clumsily, to prove that he stood for a swift drawing together.”
Moreover, the fact that Kohl and Genscher had finally agreed on something significant—the need to use Article 23 to reunify Germany—had not yet sufficiently registered in the West. While this was great news for the United States and NATO, since it meant that all current treaties and alliances would persist, it nonetheless created serious problems. Both the Poles and the Soviet Union would feel uncomfortable, to put it mildly, about a Germany that was suddenly reactivating a part of its constitution that allowed it to annex territory. They were already turning to each other for help as a result.85 The State Department analyst noted the irony that Poland was cooperating with the Soviet Union to fend off an expansive Germany: “Stalin has had the last laugh. By locating the Polish border westward to incorporate German areas, he forced the Poles to look eastward for support against German complaints,” giving “Uncle Joe’s ghost … a good frolic as the Solidarity Poles rediscovered the virtue of Soviet troops.” In Sicherman’s view, the United States would “fail utterly if we cannot give Poland and the other nations a choice of more than a Russian domination or a German domination.”