1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 28
Concerns about the cost of subsidizing Easterners who came West had caused the CDU to drop nineteen thousand votes in a state election in Lower Saxony. In fact, the costs were more than the voters knew. Kohl estimated that tending to the GDR would cost thirty to forty billion DM in 1990. If he let West Germans know that he expected it to cost another sixty billion in 1991, Kohl explained to Hurd, unification would lose all of its popularity. As a result, his goal “was to accelerate the process and to hold pan-German elections” as soon as possible before all this bad news became public. Kohl felt that his mission was clear; as he put it, “the German train was now arriving at the station. Either the Germans got on or they let it go, in which case there would not be another opportunity during his lifetime.” 198
The chancellor also summoned de Maizière and other East Germans to his holiday lake house to try to resolve their coalition’s concerns. The group discussed timing and agreed to aim for unification in early October, just two months away, so that the West German elections in December would definitely become the first national ones. An October date created various problems, however. It meant that the 2 + 4 talks absolutely had to conclude in a matter of weeks, ideally at the meeting scheduled for September 12 in Moscow. Waigel would have to give the Soviets what they wanted before then. Finally, Kohl could not maintain his public relations plan of having the CSCE summit in November bless unity before it happened. He decided that it did not matter, considering the dangers; now, a meeting merely of CSCE foreign ministers in New York on October 1–2 would suffice.199
De Maizière, fulfilling his end of the bargain even though he had personal doubts and his coalition was fracturing, managed to secure parliamentary approval of the use of Article 23 to unify the Germanies. It came after a long debate ending just before 3:00 a.m. on August 23. The date on which East Germany would formally merge with its larger Western sibling was now set for October 3.200 De Maizière also began the process of withdrawing formally from the Warsaw Pact. Such a withdrawal was technically unnecessary, but he felt that it was essential to have one anyway, to show respect to former allies and to avoid creating even more Soviet resentment.201 Buoyed by de Maizière’s success, Schäuble managed to push the unity treaty through, getting approval from both Bonn and East Berlin on August 31, once again in the wee hours of the morning.202
The last remaining obstacle was now final Soviet agreement, which had to come in two shapes: first, to some kind of final 2 + 4 accord, whereby the Soviet Union along with the other three powers would give up all quadripartite rights remaining from 1945; and second, to a bundle of accords designed to commit the Soviets to withdrawing their troops by 1994 in return for some undetermined amount of compensation.203 Although Waigel and Teltschik were working hard on the latter bundle, the Soviet delegation had no desire to match the West German’s breakneck tempo. A particular problem was that half of the Soviet delegation was from the military, not at all inclined to compromise, and indeed actually opposed what they were supposed to be negotiating.204 Shevardnadze seemed by now to be in a state of open warfare with the military, which did not help matters either. Waigel was refusing to accede to Ryzhkov’s request for twenty billion DM, and the military was digging in its heels in response.205
In addition, new problems were emerging. Russia simply refused to admit how many soldiers and dependents were living in East Germany, hinting that the number could be anywhere between 600,000 and 1.2 million, depending on how “dependents” was defined. (Both sides would later agree that it was 600,000.)206 The Red Army also wanted to continue to apply its own justice to its troops after unity. That justice included the death penalty, which was illegal under the West German law that was about to extend to the territory they inhabited. And the military wanted to know how it could monitor restrictions on Western troops in East Germany. On top of all this, a new issue arose during the drafting of the German unification treaty, concerning restrictions on foreign troop movements in the East German area. The West Germans were now proposing to include in the treaty a formal written guarantee that allied forces would “not cross a line” corresponding to the FRG-GDR border. Hutchings remembers that in the minds of the U.S. and British negotiating teams, this raised the question of whether a united Germany would be half-in and half-out of NATO. This open question caused Hutchings to send Scowcroft a memo entitled “German Unification: New Problems at End-Game.” The issue of whether the Western allies could enter the territory of the former GDR, he wrote, “cast serious doubt on the agreement we thought was at hand for the united Germany’s remaining a full member of NATO.” 207 Yet Kohl resisted the U.S. desire to expand the possibilities for non-German troops to enter East German regions.208
The chancellor got personally involved in Waigel’s negotiations. Waigel had managed to talk the Soviet side down somewhat, to 18.5 billion DM, but it was pointless as the finance minister was simply not willing to offer more than 5 or 6 billion at most. He felt that more would have dangerous consequences for the economies of both Germany and the EC. For their part, the Soviets were unwilling to sign the 2 + 4 accord until this issue was cleared up. Waigel threw up his hands and told Kohl that he had gone to the limits of the West German ability to pay. Agreeing even to 6 billion would, in his opinion, stretch the finances of the FRG painfully thin.209
Kohl decided that he needed to talk to Gorbachev personally once again to settle the matter and called him on Friday, September 7. The chancellor opened the conversation by offering the Soviet leader 8 billion DM. Gorbachev vehemently rejected this amount as a “dead end.” Indeed, he felt that such an insulting offer undermined everything that the two of them had achieved together. The Soviet leader, sounding desperate, said that he felt “like he had fallen into a trap.” 210 The implication was that his country would suffer a humiliating loss of status and standing if he accepted that amount.211 Gorbachev’s eyes had been opened to the duplicity of the West; he was the leader of a proud nation that had defeated Germany by force of arms, yet now he was falling prey to unscrupulous negotiations and a legal wrong as bad as a violent wrong. Kohl emphatically refused to indulge these emotions, insisting that the two of them could not and would not speak to each other that way. He calmed Gorbachev down by assuring him that he would think about matters again and call back at 4:30 p.m. Moscow time on Monday.
A feverish weekend ensued. Kohl tracked status reports on all of the ongoing talks. The upshot was that almost of the deals were done, but awaiting top-level approval from Moscow. In particular, the 2 + 4 accord was close to being a done deal. It contained the promises that Kohl had made Gorbachev in Archys, but there were two outstanding disagreements, mostly with the Americans and the British. First, the Americans wanted to make sure that even though nuclear weapons would not be allowed, “dual-capable” systems that could support either conventional or nuclear weapons, such as most planes, could still enter the GDR. Second, Scowcroft left a phone message for Teltschik on September 8 saying that the United States, as part of the accord, would insist on the right of Western troops to enter former GDR territory. In an interview in 2008, Zoellick, who had been the lead U.S. negotiator of the settlement agreement, recalled that he wanted to keep the door open for non-German NATO forces to cross the former GDR in the event that Poland and others would someday join NATO, although that possibility was not discussed and was only anticipatory. Scowcroft, on the other hand, said that enlargement was not an issue then and all negotiations related to Germany only.212
Whatever the longer-term implications, in September 1990 these two issues boiled down to the same fundamental question: What amount and kind of access would non-German NATO troops have to GDR territory after unification? Answering this required the three Western powers plus West Germany to come to some agreement not only between themselves but also with the Soviet Union. But Western negotiators had realized by September that they easily could outmaneuver the Soviet delegation in the 2 + 4 talks. The British team had reported home as early as May that “the Ru
ssians are clearly still trying to get their act together,” and the situation had not improved by the fall. Soviet negotiators seemed to have no clear instructions and to be improvising their responses by this time.213 So if the West Germans could find agreement with the Americans and the British on the issue, talks with the Soviet team could be managed afterward. And other than that outstanding question, the 2 + 4 accord was basically done. If Kohl could find a sum that would make Gorbachev happy, it would be over.214
Kohl pressed his advisers to tell him how far he could go without destroying the West German economy. According to the rushed internal estimates that he received over that fateful weekend, the absolute maximum would be eleven billion DM in payments over four years. He could only offer that at the risk of seriously damaging the FRG’s financial health, however.215 Kohl was willing to run that risk for the cause of unity. He decided this with little regard for the future impact on the EC, which would prove to have fateful consequences in 1992.216
The chancellor called Gorbachev on September 10 as promised and offered him eleven to twelve billion DM. Ostensibly this sum would serve to build thirty-six thousand apartments for returning Soviet solders in the USSR, but essentially it was payment for unity. Gorbachev was not satisfied. He told Kohl that fifteen to sixteen billion was the least that he could accept, snapping that this was not just a handout; Germans would benefit from a healthy Soviet Union, so “you are helping yourself.” Kohl proposed an alternative: twelve billion for the troop housing, plus an interest-free line of credit to the tune of three billion. Kohl added that he hoped Gorbachev and Bush would be willing to attend the unity ceremonies on October 3. Gorbachev gave in, saying, “I shake your hand” over the phone to signify that the deal was done, but refused to say whether he would appear in October. He and Bush had met briefly over the previous weekend at a hastily arranged summit in Helsinki, where the focus had been the Gulf.217 The leaders of the two superpowers had expressed mutual disinterest in showing up for Kohl’s final ceremony in Helsinki, although Gorbachev did not tell Kohl this on the following Monday.218
Shortly thereafter, Teltschik received word that the Soviet Union was ready to sign off on the various outstanding accords. The Americans subsequently got what they wanted as well. The 2 + 4 treaty gained an insertion that explicitly permitted dual-capable systems. And after some last-minute, late-night negotiating that involved Genscher waking up Baker at midnight for talks in pajamas, the issue of non-German NATO troop access got settled as well. An “agreed minute,” tacked on to the document at the end, stated that the united Germany could interpret the phrase “deployed” within reasonable boundaries, meaning that some deployments and exercises by the Western allies—that is, some crossing of the line between the former West and the former East Germany—would be permitted by non-German NATO troops.219 The alliance had begun to move eastward.
CONCLUSION
The 2 + 4 treaty was done. There was a signing ceremony in Moscow on September 12. Shortly thereafter, the four powers would formally relinquish their occupation rights, and NATO’s guarantees would come into force in the former GDR.220 Genscher assured Gorbachev—echoing his words to Raisa—that the Germans understood how hard this was for the USSR. The Soviet people, Genscher solemnly intoned, would never be disappointed by what they had done.221
Gorbachev invited the representatives of the six countries to a lavish lunch after the signing. Sitting at the table, Hurd was struck by the strange contrast between the mood inside and the one outside. Gorbachev was jovial and self-confident presiding over the table; but “outside all is slipping.” 222
Kohl had his building permits. The twin carrots of money and NATO reform had worked. There was still a great deal of paperwork to go—the various bilateral German-Soviet accords now had top-level blessing but still had to be finalized, and everything needed ratification from the parliaments of the countries involved—but the essentials were now in place.223 The regions of East Germany went about forming themselves into “Länder,” or states, in preparation for merger with the existing West German Länder and national elections.
Fig. 5.3. Gorbachev (center right) presides over the final signing of the 2 + 4 accord in Moscow by the six representatives of the countries involved (from left to right, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, the GDR, and the FRG) on September 12, 1990. Courtesy of Vitaly Armand/AFP/Getty Images.
In short, in the second half of 1990, Kohl got the building permits that he needed to move the prefabricated structures that had served West Germany well—its alliance, constitution, currency, and market economy—eastward to replace the ruins of Eastern socialism. The two halves of Germany carried out an economic merger in July 1990, and then completed political and legal union on the following October 3.
Neither Bush nor Gorbachev attended the celebration in Berlin, as they had discussed in Helsinki.224 The American had other priorities and the Russian did not find it wise to take part in the celebrations, given public opinion at home. While their absence dimmed the wattage of the celebrations—Kohl could not invite other world leaders as a result, because doing so would have drawn questions about Bush’s and Gorbachev’s absence from the ranks—it had no legal impact on the proceedings. The division of Germany was past. Kohl got his happy ending, at least for a while.
CONCLUSION
THE LEGACY OF 1989 AND 1990
My apologies to chance for calling it necessity My apologies to necessity if I’m mistaken after all
—Wisława Szymborska, 1972
We were interested in any information about the “main opponent,” as we called them, and the main opponent was considered NATO.
—Vladimir Putin, remembering his Cold War KGB work in Dresden1
Although unification was a done deal, there were still a number of loose ends to tie up after October 3. Kohl and his team worried about them mightily—U.S. attention, in contrast, was focused on the Gulf—but ultimately none seriously threatened German unity. The biggest outstanding problem was that the various treaties needed ratification by signatory countries. The one place where it seemed possible that they might not receive it was the Soviet Union, which could either oppose them or fall apart without conferring any final verdict. If it did the latter, the accords would forever be vulnerable to legal questions about their validity. Nevertheless, German willingness to pay up front much of what it had originally promised to provide during the years 1991–94, plus hints of future aid, helped to carry the day.2 The USSR, facing severe food shortages and massive unrest, could not afford to alienate the only reliable source of lending still available to it—namely, Bonn. Ratification succeeded.3
The Soviet Union, along with the other members of the Warsaw Pact and all NATO states, also signed the multilateral CFE accord on November 19, 1990. As discussed previously, united Germany agreed to a ceiling of 370,000 troops as part of the package. The CSCE summit in Paris approved German unity around the same time as well.4 Questions about the willingness of the Red Army to comply with the CFE and its movement of material beyond the Urals poisoned the atmosphere almost immediately afterward. In the USSR, military opponents of Shevardnadze would contribute to his resignation in December. But the CFE had already served its uses for German unification, so these events no longer endangered it.
In Germany itself, the Basic Law still had to endure minor surgery and Kohl still had to win another election on December 2. A series of edits were made to the old West German Basic Law that effectively ruled out any future territorial acquisitions, as Schäuble had promised Baker. The most important was the removal of the original Article 23. Later, it was replaced with a new version, endorsing what unity had expedited—that is, the creation of the EU. Article 146 also received alterations to make it clear that unification had been completed and that the Basic Law now covered the former GDR. In other words, the overall effect was to ensure that there would be no question of further German territorial expansion.5
On the electoral
front, Kohl’s main opponent was the SPD candidate Lafontaine, who was (rightly) convinced that the rapid unification process would soon cost West Germans more than Kohl was letting on.6 And the attention of the nation was taken away from unification altogether when a deranged man shot Schäuble twice from behind. The minister’s bodyguard leaped in front of a third bullet. Both men survived, but Schäuble was paralyzed from the chest down as a result. Ultimately, however, neither the shock of the assassination attempt nor the efforts of the opposition prevented Kohl from securing another big victory. His ruling coalition won well over half of the popular vote and secured 306 out of 507 seats in the first Bundestag elected after unity.7
In short, by the end of 1990, Kohl (with the support of his leading Western partners) had defeated all other models of the future and won another full term in office to oversee the long-term implementation of his own. Germany had unified; NATO and the EC had extended themselves eastward; the U.S. presence in Europe was solidly guaranteed; and the Soviet Union had failed to secure a lifesaving package in return. The post–Cold War era had begun.
COUNTERFACTUALS
Before speculating on the legacy of these events, it is worth stepping back for a moment to review how the model favored by Bonn and Washington prevailed while the others did not. All four of the alternative models for order in Europe were viable ones, although to varying degrees; the success of prefab was not a foregone conclusion. How could the three other models—or counterfactuals—have won the competition to define order after the collapse of the Cold War, and why did they not?