1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 32

  The question of when, exactly, discussion of NATO expansion originated is of more than just historical interest. To this day, the Russian assertion that the question of NATO expansion arose during the talks surrounding German unification—specifically in the form of guarantees that it would not occur—still complicates Western relations with Moscow. Indeed, concerns over NATO expansion were a large part of the reason that Russian leader Vladimir Putin decided to intervene in both Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.5 For their part, Western policymakers and scholars deny the Russian assertion, calling it a “myth” and claiming the issue of NATO expansion “never came up during the negotiations on German reunification.”6 The result, as one scholar of the post-Soviet space has written, is that the controversy over NATO expansion has served to “generate a militarized U.S.-Russian relationship where there should be a diplomatic one; bring the two nations closer to war than ever before; and all but exclude the possibility of further nuclear arms reductions.”7

  For me as an author, the third and biggest surprise in the response to 1989 was the growing realization that I had become, for some of the parties involved in this dispute, the bearer of unwelcome tidings. My goal in researching and writing 1989 had been to uncover as much new evidence as possible on the dramatic sequence of events immediately following the fall of the Wall. In my original months of research for the book, I assumed that the dominant narrative—that NATO expansion had nothing to do with German reunification, that it never came up before the Clinton era—was accurate. The evidence that I discovered soon made clear, however, that the U.S. and West German leaders involved were, in fact, thinking in terms of NATO expansion by February 1990, and did raise the issue with Gorbachev directly in spoken form. There was even internal speculation that same month (not shared with Gorbachev) about NATO’s future in eastern Europe. In the course of that month, however, Bonn and Washington rethought the matter and backed away from their earlier spoken remarks as the process of German unification accelerated. Indeed, President Bush became involved in the details of the diplomatic negotiations surrounding the unification of Germany to prevent such remarks from recurring. He personally insisted that, to the greatest extent possible, the future of NATO be kept out of the remaining negotiations on German unification and the written documents that they were producing in 1990. Anyone who wishes to understand relations between Washington and Moscow today, and wonders why they have deteriorated so badly, must not lose sight of this sequence of events.

  Since it is such an important sequence, it is worth revisiting the narrative of these events as described in the first edition of 1989, now expanded with the evidence that became available after the manuscript of the first edition closed in spring of 2009.8 The goal of this afterword is to bring together in one place the most significant sources on this topic, whether they appeared before or after the first edition of this book. The remainder of this essay will, as a result, summarize the key moments in the negotiations over NATO’s future, and then close with speculation on their significance for U.S.-Russian relations today.

  GENSCHER’S THINKING ON NATO EXPANSION TO EASTERN EUROPE IN 1990

  Following the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the issue of what kind of security arrangements would emerge in post-Cold War Europe formed a key part of talks between Bonn, Moscow, and Washington. The new sources help us to understand better what happened at the start of February 1990, when Genscher, the West German foreign minister, met not only with Baker but also with President Bush in Washington. At a press conference on the day of his visit, the foreign minister explained that “there was no interest to extend NATO to the east.”9 Almost as soon as Genscher made these remarks, however, the National Security Council began internally questioning whether they were wise.10

  After returning to Bonn, Genscher held a confidential conversation on February 6, 1990, with Hurd, the UK foreign minister, to give his British counterpart a summary of the talks with Bush and Baker that had just concluded. According to the West German record of the conversation, Genscher reported that “NATO does not intend to expand its territory to the East.” The West German foreign minister also felt that there should be some kind of public statement to this effect. “Such a statement must refer not just to East Germany, but rather be of a general nature. For example, the Soviet Union needs the security of knowing that Hungary, if it has a change of government, will not become part of the Western Alliance.” In other words, as early as February 6, 1990, Genscher was already thinking of NATO’s potential future in Eastern Europe. He was, however, not advocating for it. Rather, he seems to have believed that Gorbachev would want a NATO presence in Eastern Europe ruled out. He guessed that the Soviet leader would prefer to emphasize the role of the CSCE in Eastern Europe instead. As Genscher phrased it to Hurd, “in a situation in which the Warsaw Pact erodes, it will be easier for the Soviet Union” to deal with such a situation if it can find a way to use “the CSCE process” as a “safety net.”11

  The West German foreign minister’s remarks represented more than just a summary of his past talks with Baker. The next major item on his calendar was a trip with Kohl, the West German chancellor, to meet with Gorbachev in Moscow. It seems that Genscher was therefore not only bringing Hurd up-to-date on what he had discussed with Bush and Baker but also strategizing for his upcoming conversation with Gorbachev as well, due in four days.

  According to the West German transcript, Hurd agreed with Genscher’s views. The British foreign minister felt that “these questions demanded a prompt discussion within the Alliance.” In particular, the military leaders of NATO needed to consider the “the political and security consequences for NATO doctrine and force structure planning.” Genscher urged that more discussion of this issue should take place “now,” and added that NATO should consider “developments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany” as well in such discussions. He also remarked that “we do not want to extend NATO territory, but we do not want to leave NATO. In our opinion, both alliances [NATO and the Warsaw Pact] must become part of the common European security structure.”12

  Also on that same day, February 6, 1990, Baker began his own travel to Moscow. He would meet with Gorbachev, but only after first visiting Ireland and Czechoslovakia and then holding two days of talks with Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister.13 Members of the media accompanied the Secretary of State on this February trip and received background briefings from the secretary and other State Department officials in the course of the travel. In one of these en route briefings—the surviving records do not make clear whether it was Baker himself or a deputy speaking; the briefer is identified only as a “senior administration official”—a reporter asked, “how do we feel about Genscher’s proposal in toto that Germany be unified, but that NATO troops not be extended beyond what is now West Germany into the Eastern sector and that Soviet troops continue to be allowed to remain in the Eastern sector,” but did not receive a direct reply. The reporter would not give up, however, and asked the question again, rephrased slightly: “My question is to follow up on the Genscher idea.…How do you pull it off? Do you have a situation where a unified Germany is in NATO, no NATO troops in what was the GDR, but there might still be Soviet troops there for some period of time. How does that work?” The briefer finally responded: “…it [Genscher’s idea] is a way of maintaining the NATO structure and not having NATO forces further East.”14

  THE SPLIT BETWEEN BUSH AND BAKER

  After his various stops and conversations, on February 9 Baker finally sat down with Gorbachev. As the two leaders spoke, Baker made handwritten notes, which he kept in his private papers upon leaving office. The secretary put stars and an exclamation point next to his written version of his own spoken remarks: “End result: Unified Ger. anchored in a *changed (polit.) NATO—*whose juris. would not move *eastward!” Baker’s own notes appear to be the only place such an assurance was written down on February 9, however; the Secretary conveyed this assuranc
e to Gorbachev only in spoken form on that day.15 And the handwritten notes raise an interesting question. If Baker’s “end result” was that NATO’s “juris.,” presumably jurisdiction, would not move eastward, did that mean it would not move over the territory of East Germany, the question raised by the journalist during the briefing in transit?

  In answering this question, it is fortunate for scholars that Baker, Genscher, and Kohl decided that it would not be appropriate for them to meet on Soviet soil, even though by this point they were in fact closely coordinating all of their dealings with Gorbachev. Hence, Baker departed Moscow on February 10 just before the two West German leaders arrived. Instead of meeting the chancellor, Baker updated Kohl on what had transpired the day before in writing. Baker left behind with the West German ambassador in Moscow a secret letter for Kohl, summarizing what Baker had told Gorbachev on February 9, which the ambassador delivered to Kohl as soon as the chancellor landed (and that letter has been preserved in the archives). In this confidential letter to Kohl, Baker described his conversation with Gorbachev as follows: “I told him that the FRG’s leadership was strongly in favor of a unified Germany remaining in NATO and not being neutral. I explained that we agreed with this, and thought the Soviets should not reject such an outcome.” Baker reported that he had then put the crucial statement in the form of a question: “Would you [Gorbachev] prefer to see a unified Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?” In other words, NATO’s jurisdiction would not extend to eastern Germany, since NATO’s “present position” on February 10, 1990, remained where it had been throughout the Cold War: on the western side of line of division between the two Germanies. The secretary then quoted Gorbachev’s response verbatim: “‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” In Baker’s view, this meant, “by implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” Baker concluded by saying to Kohl that “we need to coordinate very closely. I’ll look forward to comparing notes with you after your meeting. Sincerely yours, Jim.”16

  Even as the secretary summarized his remarks for Kohl, however, NSC staff members who had initially questioned Genscher’s press conference remarks were now beginning to attack Baker’s words as well. Such words implied that eastern Germany could potentially become a member of NATO in name only, without full NATO jurisdiction applying to it. They felt that Baker had leaned too far forward on this issue and had done so too soon in the process.

  In an effort to undermine the damage that it felt that Baker was doing, the NSC put together a presidential letter to Kohl that was deliberately sent to arrive in Bonn before Kohl departed for Moscow. President Bush’s letter explicitly avoided the kind of assurances that Baker was giving to Gorbachev, thus revealing a split at the very top in Washington. Instead of suggesting that there would be no expansion of NATO’s jurisdiction, as Baker had done, Bush instead suggested a “special military status for what is now the territory of the GDR.” The implication was that NATO would, indeed, expand to cover what was, in February 1990, still the state of East Germany, and that there would be a special status for that territory within NATO as the alliance extended beyond its 1989 borders.17

  Kohl was thus in an interesting position as he prepared to meet with Gorbachev. He had received two letters on either end of his plane flight from West Germany to the Soviet Union on February 10: one from Bush and one from Baker. These two letters contained different wording on the same issue. The wording of the former letter, from the president, suggested that NATO’s jurisdiction would expand eastwards; the wording of the latter, from the secretary, suggested that it would not. In his own meeting with Gorbachev, which wording would the chancellor echo, that of President Bush or that of Baker?

  KOHL AND GORBACHEV

  The evidence shows that, when Kohl spoke to Gorbachev, he decided to echo Baker, not Bush. Presumably he did so because Baker’s wording was more likely to produce the results that Kohl wanted: permission from Moscow to start unifying Germany. Following Baker, Kohl assured Gorbachev that “naturally NATO could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR.”18 Similarly, Genscher told his counterpart, Shevardnadze, that “for us, it stands firm: NATO will not expand itself to the East.”19 Once again, no written agreement emerged. Gorbachev was sufficiently reassured, however, that in exchange he gave Kohl the green light to begin the first steps in the process of uniting the two parts of divided Germany, namely creating economic and monetary union. Overjoyed, Kohl decided to hold a major press conference immediately, while still in Moscow, to lock in this gain. He was so excited by this major breakthrough that he was unable to sleep, and so instead went for a long walk through Red Square in the middle of the night as he considered his next moves.20 Soon thereafter, the West German chancellor started instituting economic and monetary union between West and East Germany, a rushed process that was already completed by July 1, 1990, over three months before full political unification.

  Once Baker got back to Washington, however, he had to face the opposition from the NSC in person, and doing so forced him to reconsider his wording. Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, thought that the idea that NATO would not move once inch eastward from its present position was completely unworkable. And not only Scowcroft but also Bush worried that the new forum established by Baker for talks on the legal details of unification—the so-called “2+4” forum, for the two Germanies and the four occupying powers, Britain, France, the U.S., and the USSR—might give the Soviet Union a venue in which it could pressure the U.S. on the question of the future of NATO.21

  Shortly thereafter, discussion of NATO’s potential expansion to Eastern Europe also received its first public airing. On February 20, 1990, Hungarian politician Gyula Horn speculated about some kind of future integration of Hungary into NATO. Critics discounted his comments as an election ploy. Nonetheless, back in Washington, a member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff, Harvey Sicherman, was given the job of writing a speculative report on future security structures in not only the Germanies but also Eastern Europe. Secretary Baker, along with Ross and Zoellick, his top aides, received copies of Sicherman’s report on March 12. Baker later saved a copy and took it with him for his private archive after his time in office ended. In this March 1990 report, Sicherman indicated that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were becoming aware that cooperation with NATO was “the best way out of the German-Russian security dilemma and, with the Czech exception, the Hungarians and the Poles already see it.” Sicherman felt that the United States could offer “these nations great opportunities,” but that Washington needed to ensure that “1) taking on the burden of ‘organizing’ this region is really a vital interest [and] 2) we have the means to do so. My answer tentatively is that we alone do not have the means but that NATO and the EC surely do.”22 Both Ross and Zoellick began speculating about a potential role for NATO in Eastern Europe in early 1990 as well, in part prompted by this March memo. Baker recollected doing so by the second half of 1990 as well.23

  By April 1990, Bush felt it necessary to spell out his thinking in a detailed telegram to Mitterrand, the French president. Washington was concerned that Moscow might try to outmaneuver the U.S. in the 2+4 forum by getting the British and/or the French, both of whom potentially had reasons to share Soviet uneasiness about German unification, to block agreements that the U.S. wanted. It is worth quoting from this lengthy presidential telegram in detail.

  Bush began by saying to Mitterrand that “I am deeply committed to the U.S. political, economic and military role in maintaining European stability. And it is absolutely clear that in the period ahead a strong U.S.-French relationship is essential to that stability.” He spelled out his top priorities to Mitterrand: that united Germany should have full membership of NATO, including Article 5 guarantees, for its co
mplete territory; that allied forces should remain in united Germany even after Soviet troops departed; and that NATO should continue to deploy both nuclear and conventional weapons in the region. In his opinion, these issues were not, and should never be, up for negotiation in the 2+4 talks. Instead, the 2+4 negotiations were to focus solely on the lower-level technicalities of German unification. As the U.S. president put it, “we need to be very clear about the objectives of the two plus four.” In his view, “[t]he main purpose of the two plus four process should be to…restore full sovereignty to a peaceful, democratic, and united German state.” He was “delighted that the Western officials in the one plus three meeting [a Western preparatory session for the full 2+4 session] on April 10 agreed that the two plus four should not negotiate over Germany’s right to remain a full member of NATO; should not decide the fate of allied conventional or nuclear forces on the territory of the current FRG; should not agree on the future size of a united Germany’s armed forces; and should not replace the old four power rights with new discriminatory limits on German sovereignty—a prescription for future instability.” The problem was that the USSR “may well want the two plus four to decide all of these matters, to use the two plus four forum to undermine German security ties to the West and the coherence of NATO’s deterrent posture.” He warned Mitterrand that they should “in no event…allow Moscow to manipulate the two plus four mechanism in ways that could fracture Western defense and Germany’s irreplaceable part in it.”

  Nor did Bush see the CSCE as the way forward for post-Cold War Europe. As he put it, “I hope that you agree that the North Atlantic Alliance is an essential component of Europe’s future. I do not foresee that the CSCE can replace NATO as the guarantor of Western security and stability. Indeed, it is difficult to visualize how a European collective security arrangement including Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the Soviet Union, would have the capability to deter threats to Western Europe.” As he concluded: “NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe. If NATO is allowed to wither because it has no meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a long-term U.S. military commitment can die with it.”24