1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 44

  117. “Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President, Friday, February 16, 1990, 1:30 p.m.,” BP.

  118. GDE, 4:392–93; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 234–35.

  119. “20. Deutsch-britisch Konsultationen, London, 30. März 1990,” document 238, DESE, 996–1001; see also Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 28–29.

  120. Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990–1994, 61.

  121. Telegram, “From Amembassy London to Secstate Washdc,” “For the President and Secretary of State from Catto,” April 11, 1990, “Subject: Your Meeting with Thatcher in Bermuda,” released via FOIA to the State Department.

  122. “JAB notes … mtgs. w/ POTUS & UK PM Thatcher,” folder 16, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8; “Note to Prime Minister dated 17 April 1990: Bermuda Meeting,” released by the FCO under FOI.

  123. Telegram, “From Amebmassy Bonn to Secstate Washdc,” April 5, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA. On the significance of the Dublin meeting, see Frédéric Bozo, “France, German Unification, and European Integration,” in Europe and the End of the Cold War, ed. Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 157; he argues against Zelikow and Rice, saying that Dublin did not constitute a hasty rearguard action by the French.

  124. “Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl,” Bonn, April 3, 1990, “Betr.: Vorbereitung Sonder-ER Dublin 28. April 1990,” document 241, DESE, 1005–6. See also Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 143–44.

  125. “Initiative Kohl-Mitterrand zur Europäischen Union: Botschaft des Staatspräsidenten der Französischen Republik, François Mitterrand, und des Bundeskanzlers der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Helmut Kohl, an den irischen Premierminister und amtierenden Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates, Charles Haughey, vom 18. April 1990,” in Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), 669–70. On the conflicts, see “Vorlage des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Bitterlich an Ministerialdirektor Teltschik, Bonn, 6 Apr. 1990,” document 243, DESE, 1010–11.

  126. GDE, 2:408–9; GDE, 4:377, 410–18; Philip Zelikow, interview with author, July 27, 2008, phone conversation and subsequent emails; Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande: De Yalta à Maastricht (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), 24–25, which points out that of all the factors determining Mitterrand’s policies toward German unification, his hopes that he could use it to shape Europe’s future was the most important. As Bozo puts it, this factor, “sans doute le plus déterminant pour expliquer la politique française face aux événements considérés, concerne les enjeux d’avenir : c’est au nom d’une certaine vision de l’aprèsguerre froide—et du rôle et des intérêts de la France dans celui-ci—que la diplomatie mitterrandienne aura mis en avant une volonté forte d’encadrer et de canaliser ces mêmes événements.” On this topic, see also Elke Bruck, François Mitterrands Deutschlandbild: Perzeption und Politik im Spannungsfeld deutschland-, europa-, und sicherheitspolitischen Entscheidungen, 1989–1992 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003); Samy Cohen et al., Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).

  127. Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 445; Frédéric Bozo, “Mitterand’s France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal,” Cold War History 7, no. 4 (2007): 467. For more on West German foreign relations and the EC, see also Helga Haftendorn, “German Unification and European Integration Are But Two Sides of One Coin: The FRG, Europe, and the Diplomacy of German Unification,” in Europe and the End of the Cold War, ed. Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 135–47, and Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, trans. Deborah S. Kaiser (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

  128. “Amembassy Paris to Secstate Washdc,” April 27, 2008, released by State Department via FOIA.

  129. Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 157; Ludlow, “Naturally Supportive,” 168–69; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 211. On the impact of unification on West and united Germany’s policies toward Europe, see Jeffrey Anderson, German Unification and the Union of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); see also Eberhard Eichendorfer, “Internationale Sozialpolitik,” in 1989–1994 Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Sozialpolitik im Zeichen der Vereinigung, vol. 3, Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, ed. Gerhard A. Ritter (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2007), 1079–103.

  130. Bayerischer Rundfunk, Munich, radio report on Kohl’s speech to the Bundestag, May 10, 1990, copy in NSC Zelikow files, FOIA 2001-1166-F, BPL.

  131. Ritter, Der Preis der deutschen Einheit, 19, 58–60; W. Suraska, How the Soviet Union Disappeared: An Essay on the Causes of Dissolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 105; see also GDE, 4:141–48, 221.

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

  1. Thucydides, 1.77.4; Jürgen Habermas, Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), 142.

  2. Quoted anonymously in Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 126.

  3. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 492.

  4. Gerhard A. Ritter, Der Preis der deutschen Einheit: Die Wiedervereinigung und die Krise des Sozialstaats (Munich: Beck, 2006), 39.

  5. “Erklärung der Volkskammer der DDR vom 12.4.1990 (Auszug),” document 15, in Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1990/91: Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Friedensordnung eine Dokumentation (Bonn: Auswärtiges Amt, April 1991), 111.

  6. “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с Л. де Мезьером,” April 29, 1990, МГ, 409–23; “Prime Minister’s Meeting with the Prime Minister of the GDR,” June 27, 1990, summary sent by Charles Powell, 10 Downing Street, to J. S. Wall, FCO.

  7. Meckel became the leading figure of the East German SPD after his colleague, Ibrahim Böhme, resigned amid allegations that he had worked for the Stasi; GDE, 4:315.

  8. Markus Meckel, Selbstbewußt in die deutsche Einheit (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001), 140–41; Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk and Tom Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land mit freien Menschen: Opposition und Widerstand in Biographien und Fotos (Berlin: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft, 2006), 212–15, 224–25; Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 26–27; “German Unification: Official Level Two Plus Four, Bonn, 22 May, released by the FCO via FOI; Ritter, Der Preis der deutschen Einheit, 45; Eppelmann comments come from “Memorandum of the Eppelman-Iazov Conversation, April 29, 1990,” document 152, in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact (New York: CEU Press, 2005), 670–73; and “Records of the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Moscow, June 7, 1990” document 153, also in Mastny and Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? 674–77. The Bush statement to Kohl was reported by Teltschik on a visit to Paris: see “COMPTE RENDU DU DEJEUNER DE JACQUES ATTALI AVEC HORST TELTSCHIK (jeudi 15 mars 1990),” Présidence de la République, Le Chargé de Mission, in 5 AG 4/CDM33, Archives Nationales, Paris.

  9. “Gespräch des Staatssekretärs Bertele mit Ministerpräsident Modrow,” Berlin (Ost), 28. März 1990, document 233, DESE, 983–86.

  10. Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” DESE, 147; Ritter, Der Preis der deutschen Einheit, 203. See also David Marsh, The Euro (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 139–146.

  11. “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с Д. Хэрдом,” April 10, 1990, МГ, 391–93; “From Private Secretary, Secretary of State’s Meeting with President Gorbachev, Summary,” n.d., released by the FCO via FOI. Redactions to the latter document remove the discussion of NATO and security allianc
es still present in the former, so the summary above comes mainly from the Russian source. For an interesting discussion of the concept of a “European Germany,” by which Gorbachev understood something very different than the West did, see Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 143. The Western understanding was roughly as Cooper describes it: “The German question has been on the European agenda for more than 300 years. The original solution, Richelieu’s creation of a weak Germany, gave way—thanks to time, Napoleon and Bismarck—to a strong Germany. The third way of a European Germany seems finally to have resolved this problem.” Gorbachev’s understanding, however, appears to have been of a Germany as a link between East and West, not as the anchor of the EC in the West.

  12. “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с В. Ярузельским,” April 13, 1990, МГ, 394.

  13. Ambassador Matlock sent a long cable to Washington on May 1, detailing how Moscow’s many desires for the future; see telegram, “From Amembassy Moscow to Secstate Washdc,” May 1, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA.

  14. See the correspondence in folder 1, box 109, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP.

  15. “Moscow Embassy Cable,” May 11, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA and reproduced in the Mershon Conference volume (see bibliography for details).

  16. Reported by Powell to the U.S. ambassador in London; see Telegram, “From Amembassy London to Secstate Washdc,” “For the President and Secretary of State from Catto,” April 22, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA.

  17. Jack Matlock, interview with author, April 18, 2007, Princeton, NJ; the other U.S. policymaker wishes to remain anonymous.

  18. The leak appeared in the Frankfurter Rundschau on April 17, 1990; see DESE, 1023n1. See also Stent, Russia and Germany, 125, and “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с Л. де Мезьером,” 29 Apr. 1990, МГ, 409–423.

  19. “Non-paper der Regierung der UdSSR,” April 19, 1990, document 250, DESE, 1023–24; “Vermerk des Ministerialrats Ludewig,” Bonn, April 20, 1990, document 252, 1025–26.

  20. “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с Л. де Мезьером,” April 20, 1990, МГ, 409–23.

  21. “Записка В.М. Фалина М.С. Горбачеву,” April 18, 1990, МГ, 398–408; also reprinted in German in Valentin Falin, Konflikte im Kreml: Zur Vorgeschichte der deutschen Einheit und Auflösung der Sowjetunion. Munich: Blessing Verlag, 1997, 164–78; see also Wolfgang Schäuble, Der Vertrag: Wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte (Munich: Knaur, 1991). I am grateful to Robert Hutchings for copies of relevant documents, including “Directives for Negotiations with the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, 16–19 May 1990,” a Russian document that he had in English translation.

  22. GDE, 2:415–19.

  23. Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 198–99.

  24. “Gespräch des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik mit Ministerpräsident de Maizière und Minister Reichenbach,” Berlin (Ost), April 16, 1990, document 244, DESE, 1011–12. See also Schäuble, Der Vertrag.

  25. GDE, 2:415–19.

  26. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Botschafter Kwizinskij,” Bonn, April 23, 1990, document 253, DESE, 1026–30. Kvisinsky has published memoirs but they say little about 1989–90: J. A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler, 1993).

  27. “Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Generalsekretär Gorbatschow,” Bonn, April 24, 1990, document 255, DESE, 1033.

  28. He explained as much to Hurd; see “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Außenminister Hurd,” Bonn, May 15, 1990, document 278, 1119–20. Kohl also decided to see if he could get the G-7 to help him in his quest to buy acceptance of NATO membership, but would have little success in doing so. Teltschik, 329 Tage, 204.

  29. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsidentin Prunskiene,” Bonn, May 11, 1990, document 274, DESE, 1103–5.

  30. “Из докладной записки А.С. Черняева М.С. Горбачеву,” May 4, 1990, МГ, 424–25.

  31. “Erstes Treffen der Außenminister der Zwei plus Vier,” Bonn, May 5, 1990, document 268, DESE, 1090–94.

  32. Telegram, “From USDel Secretary in Germany, to Secstate and White House,” “Memorandum for the President,” May 5, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA.

  33. Szabo, Diplomacy, 93.

  34. “Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl,” Bonn, May 8, 1990, document 270, DESE, 1096–98.

  35. GDE, 2:418–20; see also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 258–59.

  36. Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 165.

  37. Teltschik, 329 Tage, 230.

  38. Horst Teltschik, interview with author, June 13, 2008, phone conversation.

  39. Both the Russian and German versions of the conversation are available, and they duplicate each other on substantive issues, although differ in exact wording (which is understandable, given the need for translators). “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с X. Тельчиком,” May 14, 1990, МГ, 426–36; “Gespräch des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik mit Präsident Gorbatschow, Moskau, 14. Mai 1990,” document 277, DESE, 1114–18.

  40. A copy is in Die Vereinigung Deutschlands im Jahre 1990: Verträge und Erklärungen (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1991), 13–42.

  41. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, eds., Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984–1992 (Munich: Saur, 1993), 9:423, 452–53.

  42. “Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Präsident Gorbatschow, Bonn, 22. Mai 1990,” document 284, DESE, 1136–37; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 235.

  43. “Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Präsident Gorbatschow, Bonn, 12. Juni 1990,” document 309, DESE, 1207; “Schreiben des Präsidenten Gorbatschow an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 14. Juni 1990,” document 315, DESE, 1224–25; Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 170.

  44. Teltschik, 329 Tage, 249.

  45. Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 352.

  46. “Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn, 3. Mai 1990,” document 265, DESE, 1076–78; see also telegram, “From USMission USNATO, to Secstate Washdc,” April 17, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA.

  47. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Außenminister Baker,” Bonn, May 4, 1990, document 266, DESE, 1079–84; for more on this topic, see also Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (London: Polity, 2008).

  48. Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1997), 132–33.

  49. Summary of May 17 meeting, reprinted in Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 130–31; Horst Teltschik, interview with author, June 13, 2008, phone conversation.

  50. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 259, 272.

  51. Timothy Naftali, George H.W. Bush (New York: Times Books, 2007), 92.

  52. The text of the Final Act is on the website of the successor organization to the CSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, available at http://www.osce.org/item/15661.html. The full list of signatories, from the same location, is as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the GDR, the FRG, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. I am also grateful to Robert Hutchings and Philip Zelikow for conversations and emails on th
is point.

  53. “Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Washington, 17. Mai 1990,” document 281, DESE, 1126–32; Kohl also reported to Mitterrand about what had been discussed in “Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Bonn, 23. Mai 1990,” document 286, DESE, 1143–45. See also the press clippings criticizing the Bush administration for not supporting Lithuania more strongly in folder 14, box 176, 12b chapter files, series 12, BP.

  54. Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 412; Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 419–22. For more on Yeltsin, see Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

  55. Memo from Jim Thomson, president and CEO of the RAND Corporation, “Subject: Soviet Views on Germany,” May 24, 1990, NSC Zelikow files, FOIA 2001-1166-F, BPL.

  56. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 301–2; Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 211n26.

  57. Telegram, “From USDel Secretary in USSR, to Secstate Washdc and the White House,” May 18, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA.

  58. “Gorby Kremlin 5/18/90,” handwritten notes, folder 1, box 109, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP.

  59. “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с Дж. Бейкером,” May 18, 1990, МГ, 437–45, especially 438.

  60. “Gorby Kremlin 5/18/90”; “Из беседы М.С. Горбачева с Дж. Бейкером,” especially 442.

  61. Telegram, “From USDel Secretary in USSR, to Secstate Washdc and the White House,” May 19, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA. As part of the planning for the Washington summit, Baker sent a note to Scowcroft, asking him to include in formal events those people who had been part of his delegation in Moscow; the secretary described this team as his “core” group on unification. In the order listed, these were Jack Matlock, Robert Gates, Ronald Lehmann, Reginald Bartholomew, Robert Zoellick, Paul Wolfowitz, Raymond Seitz, Margaret Tutwiler, Dennis Ross, Richard Clarke, Richard Schifter, Eugene McAllister, Steve Hadley, Reed Hanmer, Arnold Kanter, Richard Burt, David Smith, James Woolsey, Stephen Ledogar, C. Paul Robinson, Howard Graves, Curtis Kamman, Avis Bohlen, V. Kim Hoggard, Condoleezza Rice, Eric Edelman, Linton Brooks, James Collins, James Timbie, Alexander Vershbow, Victor Alessi, and Andrew Carpendale. See note from Baker to Scowcroft, May 24, 1990, folder 11, box 115, 8e White House meetings, series 8, BP.