1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Read online

  When they got there they found chaos and tried to figure out what had happened. There seemed to have been roughly a hundred thousand people outside the headquarters by 5:30 p.m.41 Protesting workers were building a wall, as promised, and demonstrators were chanting slogans like “open the door,” when (as one participant put it) “to everyone’s amazement, it actually opened.” Later, the party would accuse the protesters of breaking in; for its part, dissidents would claim that the door had opened from inside and there had been Stasi agents planted in the crowd to turn the event into a violent one. Regardless of the cause, the consequences of the door’s opening were immediate. The crowd rushed in. People screamed when they saw portraits of Honecker still hanging on the walls, even though he had been ousted three months earlier. Someone also found a portrait of the détente era Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. According to one eyewitness, “what happened next must be condemned and not called good. Doors were broken down and what we saw took our breath away.” Stockpiles of silver and crystal, canned goods and alcohol, and meat lockers filled with vast quantities of delicacies horrified the crowd. Two hours of vandalism, pilfering, and theft from what was essentially the high temple of repression followed. Yet even as some protesters broke windows and spray-painted walls, others tried to preserve the peaceful nature of the East German revolution by yelling “no violence!” Only after Modrow and the dissident leaders arrived, and appealed for calm, did protesters eventually leave the building.42

  Within forty-eight hours, the round table’s “Working Group: Security” announced that it had secured the files at the Stasi headquarters and henceforth none would leave. The meeting of the round table on January 22 concluded that the building was still functional and could have been used to reactivate the secret police. By March 31, most of the employees of Normannen Street were out of a job. Nevertheless, portions of the Stasi would continue to operate and destroy documents; as late as September 1990, Bohley and Havemann’s widow would find it necessary to occupy a main Stasi archive building, to force access to the files even as the two Germanies finalized unification.43

  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BRUSH WITH A STAGE OF TERROR

  This brush with mass violence had three significant consequences. First, it eliminated any remaining authority held by Modrow and indeed all members of the old guard. Throughout fall 1989, the GDR public had been increasingly horrified to learn of the luxuries that their party leaders hoarded while ordinary people had to do without heat or meat; now they had further confirmation of corruption behind Stasi office doors and were fed up. The former leadership of the country would soon be charged with high treason. Modrow saw a danger (as he told Seiters) “that things would go completely out of control.” 44 He also looked to Gorbachev for help, complaining that strikes and continued mass emigration were crippling the country, and the necessities of daily life were becoming scarce.45 Ominously, Modrow also pointed out that animosity toward the Soviet troops stationed there was growing.

  Second, even though the January 15 protest showed the dissident leadership and the crowds as a united entity, it would be the last time. As a result of the chaos of mid-January, members of the round table would join the government in the hopes of steadying the ship of state. They forced Modrow to accept an earlier date of March 18, 1990, for the East German elections, thereby making both his tenure and that of the round table even shorter.46 And they intensified efforts to produce a new constitution in time for the March election. In other words, they accelerated their heroic efforts to create a new model for East Germany’s future, precisely as all remaining popular interest in that version of the future evaporated. Convinced by the events of January that reform in the GDR was simply not possible, crowds would turn out en masse for election speeches by leaders of Western parties.

  Third, the January upheaval confirmed Kohl’s belief that establishing confederative structures with East Germany was not worth any time or effort. As the chancellor explained to the U.S. ambassador in West Germany, the January 15 affair was “catastrophic.” 47 Although Kohl still had various conversations scheduled with Modrow, they would be empty exercises, and Modrow’s pleas for fifteen billion DM in aid would simply go unanswered.48 Kohl became convinced that the East Germans could not even maintain a functioning government and so he—and not the four powers or anyone else—had to provide one as soon as possible. This meant, among other things, preventing any further quadripartite activity without his involvement. As Kohl put it to Modrow, on one of their rare points of agreement, the four powers “are not allowed to regard us as a protectorate.”49 One of Kohl’s aides, Peter Hartmann, reported to him in January that the best option for Bonn would be to come up with some kind of process that included the four powers but also constrained them. The goal was to keep them busy, but not in a way that would “allow them to assume a role that we find undesirable.” So if Bonn could successfully define a narrow realm of action for the big four, it could thereby assume responsibility for the rest. The main problem with regard to the four powers, Hartmann predicted, would be the issue of troop stationing. Put more precisely, how could Bonn get the Soviet troops to leave while the Western forces stayed? That was clearly a tall order. To make sure that he was on top of all of these issues, Kohl should, well before the East German elections on March 18, come up with his own new model of the path to unity.50

  Kohl’s resolve only hardened when he heard about an interview that Thatcher had given to the Wall Street Journal at the end of January 1990. Thatcher had decided to air her grievances publicly, and chose a U.S. newspaper to do so, meaning that Washington could not miss her point. She argued that “early German unity could create such enormous political problems for Gorbachev that he might lose power. That would be a disaster for everyone.” The British prime minister called on Kohl to put a “longer view of Europe’s needs” before his own “more narrow, nationalistic goals.” She cautioned that “building democracy is much harder than tearing it down” and hasty actions would not work. Nor was the EC ready for German unity, given its democratic deficits: “The irony of West Europe going to more central, non-elected decisions at the same time as East Europe is crying out for democracy is too absurd for words.” 51 This latter line was not one to warm the heart of Mitterrand, given his devotion to the cause of the EC. Speaking on Italian television the day after the Thatcher interview appeared, he dismissed the idea that there should be a “lapse of time” before Eastern Europe could join the EC.52

  And of course, nothing in the article warmed hearts in Bonn, which was presumably the point. Teltschik’s assessment of the article was that Thatcher was stuck in the nineteenth century and still felt that Britain had to watch over Europe.53 Foreign Minister Hurd tried to undo some of the damage with a speech in Bonn, stating that “we had accepted, and indeed advocated, the right of self-determination by the German people for many years.” 54 He would also meet with Kohl soon after it appeared. Usually a foreign minister and a head of government meeting would be a breach of protocol, but with communication between the chancellor and the prime minister “being virtually non-existent, each was willing to compensate by extending courtesies to the other’s Foreign Minister.” Nothing helped. The British Foreign Office estimated afterward that the Wall Street Journal interview had caused “enormously great pain” in the chancellor’s office. No matter how much Hurd or others might try to be cooperative, “it is widely believed in Germany, in the press and at the very highest level there, that the Prime Minister has radically different views on the subject.” As a result, “the views of the British Ministers other than the Prime Minister are of little significance in the present circumstances.” 55

  In another sense the article was useful to Bonn, because it made it clear to the West Germans that Thatcher was on her own. The prime minister might wish to “dilute German influence in Europe,” as she privately told Hurd that she wanted to do, but she was failing to build a coalition to achieve that goal. Washington was supportive of Kohl, and Mitterrand w
as not willing to be obstructive, so it was really Gorbachev that Kohl had to worry about. The approval of the United States and France might be necessary, but it was not sufficient. Ultimately it would be Moscow, with over half a million troops and dependents on German soil, that would decide whether unification could happen or not.56

  Unfortunately, Gorbachev was stonewalling. Kohl had been trying to arrange a face-to-face meeting since the day that Portugalov had shocked Teltschik. But Gorbachev had simply not responded. Instead, he had let it be known that he was trying to reduce his foreign appointments in early 1990.57 Partly this was due to the pressure of internal affairs, most notably the economic situation and rising secessionist pressures. In January, Gorbachev traveled personally to Lithuania in an attempt to halt its drive for independence, and the Red Army forcibly suppressed unrest in Azerbaijan.58 Partly this was due, however, to a lack of clarity in Moscow as to how to proceed, and Gorbachev could hardly face Kohl until he had decided. In the meantime the Soviet leader had made another attempt to revive the restoration model, but it had failed.59

  Gorbachev was in dire need of a new strategy. A serious assessment of the German situation was overdue. He, like everyone else, hardly wanted violence to consume a country where he had four hundred thousand troops stationed. Amazingly, though, from the November collapse of the wall until late January, there appear to have been no substantive evaluations of the German situation among party leaders in Moscow. The military seems to have been completely in the dark as to his thinking. And internal affairs remained pressing; as already mentioned, by 1990 shortages would become as severe as they had been during World War II. Gorbachev’s penchant for indecision and procrastination on foreign policy was becoming harmful. As a result, Gorbachev finally assembled his advisers in his office at the end of January 1990 for what can only be called a brainstorming session.60

  According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev opened the meeting by acknowledging that the authority of their allies in East Germany was collapsing. The real question now was where to place the bets: “Kohl or the SPD.” To some extent this was a false question, since Moscow had recently increased its dependency on Kohl. At the beginning of January, Shevardnadze had admitted to Bonn that Moscow was facing a shortage of foodstuffs, particularly meat. Kohl responded by approving a government subsidy for the sale of 220 million DM worth of food to the USSR, and documents to this effect would be signed in February 1990.61

  But despite this weakness, the Soviet Union was not entirely without leverage. Party leaders in Moscow had numerous contacts in the SPD, having worked closely with them in an earlier political generation to negotiate détente. Moreover, Soviet leaders knew that the Social Democrats were heavily favored to win the March elections in East Germany. The SPD might become the leading all-German party of the future, and those contacts could prove useful. On top of this, whoever won on March 18 would still have to deal with the Soviet troops there, which gave Moscow a role regardless of the outcome of the vote.

  Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB, felt that the SED’s days were numbered, but argued for taking a closer look at the eastern socialists—that is, the SPD of East Germany. A Politburo member, Yakovlev, suggested that Modrow could be made to enter the SPD and propose unification, with Soviet backing. Objections came from Falin’s deputy, Rafael Fedorov, who shared Falin’s worries about a united Germany. He said that this could go badly wrong, and much of West Germany did not want reunification anyway. Chernyaev noted afterward that Fedorov and Falin were still very much attached to the SED, whereas he focused more on international relations than inner–German party politics. Chernyaev suggested that perhaps the “six”—meaning the four powers but this time with the two Germanies—should create a forum to decide matters. Bonn and Washington had already started thinking about such a forum as well.

  The January brainstorming session did not yield a precise plan; rather, Gorbachev summed up the meeting by saying that the most important goals were winning time and prolonging the reunification process as much as possible. He suggested that Moscow should play on the fears of the West Europeans, including West Germans, about the cost of suddenly supporting sixteen million East Germans: “This is our strategy.” In the meantime, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the former chief of the general staff and now Gorbachev’s military aide, should start thinking through the implications of Soviet troop withdrawal from East Germany.62

  What specifics did emerge from this session concerned the scheduling of future bilateral meetings. Gorbachev would finally respond to Kohl’s request for a personal meeting, but only agree to meet after talking to Modrow at the end of January and then Baker on February 7–9, 1990, to get the lay of the land.63 As a result, the group agreed that Kohl could not be invited for a date any sooner than the last day of Baker’s visit, but that he should arrive as soon as possible after that; Kohl, eager to move forward, would travel to Moscow on Saturday, February 10.64

  EMERGING CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS AND NATO

  In the meantime, Kohl was becoming increasingly aware that in the run-up to the East German election, foreign and domestic politics were a combustible mixture. There were two major issues. The first problem was the extent of Polish unhappiness about events in divided Germany. Polish economic rejuvenation, which had been one of Kohl’s main priorities earlier in the fall, was now less important to him in the face of an East German election in March. But the prospect of major changes in East Germany reopened questions about territory and reparations. The tenor of the contacts between Bonn and Warsaw, which had been respectful earlier in the fall, became increasingly fraught. A speech that Kohl had given in mid-January in Paris had failed to reassure Poles and others.65 Mazowiecki pushed on January 30 for even more financial help than had been agreed in November.66

  Soon, Mazowiecki and others would also begin pressing for fresh guarantees of the inviolability of the East German–Polish border. Back in 1945, the Potsdam Conference had left the final definition of that border open, pending a peace settlement. The subsequent West German–Polish Treaty of 1970 and the CSCE Final Act had, in contrast, recognized existing borders as inviolable. If the clock was turning back to 1945, when the unity of Germany had been an open question, then Poland wanted to be sure it had locked down its western border, particularly after having lost much land in the East to the Soviet Union.67 Largely for domestic political reasons, Kohl would be slow to give such guarantees. Indeed, he would further anger his opponents by citing Stalin era accords to justify his actions. At the beginning of 1990 this nastiness was still in the future, but it would not be long in coming.

  A second problem involved the mixture of two kinds of alliance politics—namely, West German domestic political alliances and NATO. Kohl’s current partner, Genscher, was now becoming his competitor as well. Both of their parties, the CDU and the FDP, had affiliates in East Germany and would be competing with each other for votes. Genscher’s fellow liberals in the East, along with Moscow, the media, and indeed most of the world, were expecting the SPD to become the dominant party in East Germany after March 18, so too much closeness to the CDU was not advisable. Kohl had decided in the meantime that the East German CDU should face the election in an alliance with other parties, but that the Liberals would not be one of them. Instead, the chancellor served as the guiding spirit behind the formation on February 5 of the Alliance for Germany, combining the East German CDU and minor parties. (Among other consequences, this alliance eventually created the national political career of the future chancellor, Merkel. She was originally a member of one of the smaller parties, Democratic Awakening, as indicated previously; but her party would eventually merge with the CDU.)

  Not coincidentally, two days later Kohl also unveiled the alliance’s most useful campaign tool: the promise to seek rapid monetary and economic union between the two Germanies. The immediate goal of this announcement was to persuade the masses of would-be refugees, still moving west in droves, to stay home. Protesters had been marching with s
igns reading, “If the DM doesn’t come to us, we will go to it.” Now they were being told that it might, in fact, come to them. The longer-term goal was to secure electoral advantages for the Alliance for Germany.68

  As a result of the intensifying competition in January and February 1990, Genscher therefore had an incentive to raise his profile, and his actions blurred the line between domestic and foreign alliance politics. The foreign minister made his own views about the future plain in a speech at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing on January 31. In this controversial address, Genscher called on NATO to state clearly that “whatever happens to the Warsaw Pact, an expansion of NATO territory to the East, in other words, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union, will not happen.” Any attempt to put East German territory into NATO was undesirable because of the risk that it would block the rapprochement between the Germanies and cause a backlash in the Soviet Union.69

  Genscher then traveled to Washington on Friday, February 2, to see whether his fellow secretary of state, Baker, agreed with him about this. In a friendly two-and-a-half-hour conversation in front of a roaring fire, Baker stressed the need for continued West German membership in NATO.The secretary in turn sought Genscher’s thoughts on a new idea. Like Kohl’s and Gorbachev’s advisers, Baker and his State Department team were independently coming to the same conclusion: some kind of forum for the four powers plus the two Germanies was necessary. In other words, a “4 + 2” mechanism could supervise the external aspects of German unification. It would address such questions as how quadripartite powers would be relinquished, but not the technicalities of the inner-German merger. Genscher said he would support the idea if it was clearly a “2 + 4” mechanism—that is, with the Germans clearly identified as the most important states at the table—and not 4 + 2. Baker concurred with this, and so the 2 + 4 concept was validated. Afterward, in a joint press conference at 7:45 p.m. on Friday, Genscher stated publicly that he and Baker had agreed that “there was no interest to extend NATO to the East.” 70 Baker, aware that Genscher and Kohl did not always tell each other what they were planning, instructed his ambassador in Bonn to report personally to Teltschik about these events, so Baker could be sure that Kohl was informed about it.71