1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Read online

  Baker’s cover note was the second major missive that Kohl had received from top U.S. leadership in the same number of days. He had gotten a letter from Bush the night before, as he was preparing to depart for Moscow, saying that the president wanted “to confirm again to you my view of the role of a unified Germany in the Western alliance.” This presidential message, put together by the NSC out of its concern about Baker’s formulations, sounded a different note from Baker. Instead of using general language about NATO’s jurisdiction, the presidential letter used specific language about East Germany. Bush indicated (picking up a phrase originated by Wörner) that he would agree to a “special military status for what is now the territory of the GDR.” 99 Zelikow remembers this extraordinary presidential missive as an attempt to make it clear to Kohl that the White House, concerned about the implications of Baker’s wording, preferred a different approach. The idea was that a letter from the president would trump a letter from the secretary.100

  As a result, by the time that he arrived in downtown Moscow, Kohl had received personal messages from both Bush and Baker with their preferred wordings—and they were not identical. The open question was which language he would use in his talks with Gorbachev. When the moment arrived, he would echo Baker. Whether Kohl would do so because he had missed the discrepancy between the two, or because he knew what the discrepancy meant but found Baker’s approach more useful as a short-term negotiating tactic, is unclear. What is clear is that he and Teltschik were trying hard to soften up Gorbachev. They had already prepared the ground before their departure with a well-timed announcement that the sky was falling. In a briefing for journalists before the Moscow trip, Teltschik had strategically let slip that East Germany was on the brink of insolvency. It would be unable to pay debtors in a few days. This caused an enormous splash in the media, and so headlines about the dawn of economic doomsday in the GDR accompanied the chancellor to Moscow and strengthened his case that drastic measures were needed.101

  The critical Soviet–West German bilateral meeting involved Gorbachev, Chernyaev, Kohl, Teltschik, and translators. The chancellor began by bemoaning Modrow’s botched efforts to reinvigorate the Stasi. State authority had broken down completely as a result. Kohl was particularly worried about the safety of East Germany’s nuclear power program and mentioned Chernobyl in passing. The chaos should worry Gorbachev as well, he argued, “given that 400,000 Soviet troops plus their dependents are stationed there.” Increasingly, only the DM was accepted in exchange for goods.

  For all of these reasons, Kohl wanted to institute economic and monetary union as quickly as possible. Five weeks earlier he had not thought this way, but now he did. He admitted that this decision had subjected him to attacks from the West Germans who would have to pay for it, but he could live with the criticism “and it did not disturb him unduly.” The time to act was now. The question of unification had become unavoidable. He wanted to unify Germany and bring it into NATO. And Kohl assured Gorbachev that “naturally NATO could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR.” Kohl also emphasized his agreement with Adenauer’s saying that the German problem could only be solved under a European roof.

  Gorbachev asked a number of questions in response. He wanted to know about the potential timeline and about border issues with Poland. He understood that Germany did not want to become a neutral state, but asked if it could perhaps be nonaligned, like India. According to Kohl, Gorbachev agreed, less than heartily, that the question of internal unity was one for the Germans themselves to decide. Sensing what the quid pro quo might be, Kohl made it clear that Gorbachev could count on him for help. The chancellor pointed out that the German economy was in a healthy state. Indeed, “the last eight years were the best since the war.” It was therefore “natural” that West Germany and the Soviet Union “could do much together.” 102

  Kohl knew that he had to lock in this somewhat uncertain agreement as soon as possible. He called for a press conference for 10:00 p.m. that same night. Like Baker, the chancellor understood the power of the press and wanted to use it right away. West German television viewers heard him proclaim by satellite that it was “a good day for Germany and a happy day for me personally.” The Soviet leader had agreed that it was the “sole right of the German people” to make decisions about their future.103 “Secretary General Gorbachev has promised me clearly that the Soviet Union will respect the decision of Germans to live in one state, and that it will be a matter for Germans themselves to decide the path to, and timing of, their unification.” Teltschik, who had helped to draft this announcement, expected the assembled journalists to jump to their feet and applaud, but they did not. He thought that perhaps the reporters did not realize what had just happened: Moscow had agreed to let Germans begin the process of internally unifying their country. If the journalists missed the significance, Kohl did not. He was so moved by the event that he needed a long walk through Red Square with a few colleagues before he could calm down enough to go to sleep in the small hours. Only the next day, when the Soviet news agency TASS released a statement confirming what Kohl had announced, does Teltschik remember West German journalists starting to take sufficient interest.104

  These two bilaterals were the origin of a later controversy. Moscow would claim that they represented a promise, or pledge, that NATO would remain in its 1989 borders, as indicated above. Because of this, it is worth reviewing these meetings in light of the Russian assertion.

  Baker, according to the book by Zelikow and Rice, made clear to Kohl what he had discussed with Gorbachev: a unified Germany, tied to NATO “with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position.” Baker and Zelikow said that the discussion with Gorbachev dealt solely with East Germany and no other states of the Warsaw Pact. During an interview in 2009, Baker recalled that this position was not a pledge, but a speculative proposition for the purpose of negotiations. Had Gorbachev agreed to it at the time, it might have become a deal. But the Soviet leader did not and it was superseded by later changes to the U.S. position, which were made public by the time of the Camp David meeting later that February. Baker remembered that Gorbachev did not object to this changed position at the time or later, when it was twice personally communicated it to the Soviet leader by both the secretary and President Bush, once in Moscow and once in Washington. Indeed, Gorbachev approved the Soviet Union’s signing of a number of final agreements consistent with the changed position.105

  More problematic are the events of the next day, February 10. Kohl arrived and reinforced Baker’s proposition by echoing it in his own conversation with Gorbachev, despite at least suspecting that it was based on a U.S. position that was still evolving. Unlike the U.S.-USSR bilateral, however, the USSR–West German bilateral did not end in speculation. Instead, Gorbachev agreed to his component of the bargain: he said that Germany could unify. Kohl took this concession and publicized it within hours of receiving it. As such, in understanding the origin of Russian resentment about the events of February 1990 (to be discussed further in the conclusion to this book), it is essential to consider not just U.S.-Soviet contacts but also the role of the West Germans as well. Gorbachev did not act on Baker’s speculation, but he did act on Kohl’s. The way in which this happened was problematic in at least two ways: on the part of Gorbachev, and on the part of Kohl. Gorbachev did something unwise—namely, fulfilling at least some of his part of the bargain without getting written assurances that the other side would do the same—and Kohl got such a bargain on the basis of a U.S. position that was already in flux, as he knew from the Bush letter. If Gorbachev had been a more aggressive negotiator and had not had so many other distracting balls in the air, he might have pressed for written guarantees from either Baker or Kohl. But he did not, and by the end of February it would be apparent that he would never get them. Gorbachev seems not to have understood this sequence of events at the time, although by the end of the year he would angrily turn on Kohl
. As for Kohl, in the course of the upcoming Camp David meeting at the end of February, he would come to agree with the Bush position: only full NATO membership for a united Germany would be acceptable, with a special status for East Germany. The chancellor agreed with the president despite the fact that this was not identical to the language he had used with Gorbachev on February 10.

  At the time of these bilaterals, there is no evidence that the thinking about NATO’s future went beyond East Germany, although such ideas would emerge within the year. In separate interviews, Baker, Zelikow, and Zoellick all indicated that there were musings at the State Department in the latter half of 1990 about the possibility of NATO expansion, although only in a speculative way. An internal State Department document, to be discussed below, hints at theoretical conversations as early as March 1990, but not at the time of these bilaterals. Regardless, the seeds of an enormous future controversy were sown. For the moment, however, Kohl felt that it was a “good day for Germany.” 106

  PROPERTY PLURALISM

  If February 10 was a good day for Kohl, it was not a good one for the round table of East Germany. Events were moving too quickly. The worst fears of its leaders were being realized. If they did not form a stable government, and soon, then foreign governments (which for them included Bonn) would do it for them. The round table therefore took steps to advance its own authority. Eight of its members became ministers in Modrow’s government. Some of them, including Gerd Poppe, Wolfgang Ullmann of Democracy Now, and Eppelmann of Democratic Awakening, took part personally in a trip to Bonn on February 13, just days after Kohl got back from Moscow.

  It was a visit, the records show, that they took seriously but Kohl and his aides did not.107 The chancellor was fresh from his success with Gorbachev, had already decided that Modrow was hopeless, and was willing to bet that he could beat the would-be knights of the round table in the electoral duel next month.108 Poppe, who had put himself into the contest as a candidate for the dissident party Alliance ‘90, tried to pin Kohl down on guarantees that “the social net would not rip.” Ullmann complained that Kohl wanted an “Anschluss” with the GDR. Kohl, rejecting the application of the term Anschluss to the actions of democratic states, informed the East German delegation bluntly that “the details of the path to unity are not up for discussion.” 109

  These diplomatic activities went far beyond the round table’s original vision for itself, which was to serve as an entity separate from the government, but one that would challenge it when necessary (as it had done over the Stasi).110 Now, in addition to projects like the closure of Stasi buildings, the round table also began taking stances on foreign policy. On February 19, it drew up a resolution opposing NATO entry for a future united Germany. “A NATO membership for the future Germany cannot be combined with the goal of German unity achieved in the context of a European peace-order and is therefore rejected.” Rather, the two Germanies should first unite, hold a constitutional convention (as foreseen in Article 146 of the West German Basic Law), write a new all-German constitution, have elections on the basis of it, and only then let those elected decide on alliance membership.111

  In addition, the round table was creating an entirely new model for the future of East Germany. By March 12, the working group charged with drafting the new constitution—coordinated by the energetic Gerd Poppe—could present a lengthy document to the sixteenth and final meeting of the round table. This draft intentionally diverged from both the existing East and West German constitutions. Echoing Gorbachev’s own attempts to redefine the notion of property, it agreed neither with the notion that the private ownership of property was morally and ideologically wrong nor with the U.S. model that private ownership of property was essential. The controversial U.S. historian Charles Beard—a man whom the Poppes would have found sympathetic—had argued in 1913 that the U.S. Constitution was essentially an economic document—one that protected the rights of property from popular majorities. Beard meant this controversial claim as an indictment, in an era where alternate views for the economic organization of society competed for attention; it caused a furor at the time. Although it is unlikely that Poppe or any other round table members knew of Beard, they clearly shared his criticism of Western constitutions.

  The draft was, in essence, an attempt to find the much-discussed third way in the contest between the visions of modernity offered either by Communism or capitalism. The goal was to balance social justice with individuality and property ownership.112 One of the concepts behind it was the notion of “property pluralism.” Instead of a Western-style constitution founded on the rights of private property, or an Eastern-style one founded on the socialist concept of “the people’s property,” New Forum member Klaus Wolfram suggested that the GDR Constitution have property pluralism. In other words, it should consider both kinds of property to be equal in the future society.113 By that he seems to have meant that private property would be the default, but there would exist a number of agreedon situations in which the state could intervene. In a crisis, it could take aggressive action, as suggested in Article 34 of the draft.

  Moreover, there would also be a right to work enshrined in Article 31 of the “Basic Rights” section of the new constitution. Men and women would have to be treated equally. The citizens of the future GDR would additionally have the constitutional right to social security, health care and disability coverage, and unemployment support. Presumably the enforcement of these articles would justify state intervention. There was also an implication in Article 34 that such intervention might happen if property were to be used in a way that damaged the environment.114

  The moved-up elections in March put an end to the round table, but its working group for constitutional drafting kept going until April 4. It sent a letter on that date to the newly elected East German delegates to the Volkskammer, or People’s Chamber, with a copy of the unanimously approved final draft. It requested that “you engage yourself in getting the Volkskammer to put this Constitution into force.” 115 The letter expressed the hope that its draft could not only provide a model for the future of East Germany but also influence a future unified Germany. If West Germany were to follow its own Basic Law’s road map to unification—that is, calling a constitutional convention under Article 146—success in creating a GDR code of laws would give East Germans a sound basis for negotiating in that future convention. In other words, perhaps the East German vision for property pluralism and other social protections would become enshrined in the future all-German constitution.

  The round table’s expansion of its own authority caused many East Germans to put pen to paper and send in their opinions. The long time lag between the dates on the postmark and the dates of receipt in Berlin testified to the breakdown in basic postal services.116 Some correspondents welcomed the efforts of the round table to establish an enduring order for the GDR. “Are we going to be sold for nothing and the citizens of our country betrayed?” asked a woman from Leipzig on February 8. “Every reasonable person sees the dangers awaiting us if we are steam-rolled into a monetary union with West Germany,” read another letter. One correspondent was even more worried: East Germans “will become an army of slaves on Kohl’s plantation.” 117

  But a significant number thought that the arduous attempts of the round table to map out a third way were unnecessary. “Take the hand that West Germany is offering. … [T]he people are fed up. The revolution continues, but it is becoming less peaceful,” suggested one letter writer. From Merseburg came the question of when the round table’s members had last spent any time talking to people besides each other. When, the author asked, did you last visit real workers? Most of them “are clear about the fact that we will not be able to start over all by ourselves,” and so the GDR should accept help from West Germany, not make demands of it.118

  Other letters were even more blunt. When, asked one, will you finally say yes “to a speeded-up tempo for monetary union and reunification?” 119 Or another: “Quick monetary union is th
e only thing that can save us. Half of Leipzig is already working in the West.” This author called on the round table to disband as well, because it could do nothing—a sentiment that an anonymous letter writer shared: “You idiots! Why are you still working? Your time is up.” 120

  CONCLUSION

  In the course of early 1990, both East Berlin and Moscow began offering their visions for the future. Socialist dissidents followed Havemann’s example by producing a specific legal road map for the future of an independent East Germany, including property pluralism with mechanisms for the state to intervene in economic crises. Meanwhile, Gorbachev and his advisers marched to their own drummer and postulated grand but vague futures.121

  These visions were heroic models in both the positive and the negative senses of the word. They reached for the sky, with laudable goals. With more time, they might have become more developed and feasible.122 But they would require superhuman effort, and neither Gorbachev’s opponents in the Soviet Union nor the East European population were willing to give them the time that they needed. By the end of the 1980s, in the words of one historian, public opinion had become an “effective solvent of power.” 123

  The broader East German population had been willing to support the opposition “elite” in fall 1989 and early 1990, when both shared the goal of tearing down the SED regime. If they agreed on what needed to go, however, they did not agree on what the future should hold. After the brush with a stage of terror, the latter redoubled efforts to move on to reformed socialism in East Germany, while the former turned West. The shortcomings of daily life had left Eastern Europe with a profound distrust in grand socialist narratives and little tolerance for edited versions.