1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 37

  73. Some of the analysis in the next few pages is drawn from my “Elite Intransigence and the End of the Berlin Wall,” German Politics 2 (August 1993): 270–87. I am grateful to Wade Jacoby, one of the editors of German Politics, for his permission to reuse some of this article here. Gareth Dale sees a similar force at work, which he refers to as a “radicalising dynamic.” See Gareth Dale, The East German Revolution of 1989 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); see also his Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945–1989 (London: Routledge, 2005). See also Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

  74. For more on the rigidity of the SED, see Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 262. See also various elements of the press coverage of Gorbachev’s visit to the GDR for its fortiethanniversary celebrations on October 7, 1989, which are available in many places; a few citations follow here. His major speech on the occasion was published under the title “Uns vereinen die Ideale des Sozialismus und des Friedens,” Neues Deutschland, October 9, 1989, 3–4. Remarks to journalists were reproduced in many places; see in particular Christian Schmidt-Häuer, “Die Widerspenstigen Lähmung,” Die Zeit, October 13, 1989, 3. Other public signs during his visit that Gorbachev had abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine were cited in “‘Die Geduld ist zu Ende,’” Der Spiegel, October 9, 1989, 18. Günter Mittag published the transcript of Gorbachev’s address to the East German Politburo in Günter Mittag, Um jeden Preis (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1991). Finally, contemporary analysis of Gorbachev’s personal role can be found in, for example, Michael Howard, “1989: A Farewell to Arms?” International Affairs 65 (Summer 1989): 407; see also J. F. Brown, Surge to Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 55.

  75. Jonathan Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 155–56, 323. For more on the status of the late 1989 East German economy, see Hans-Hermann Hertle, “Staatsbankrott: Der ökonomische Untergang des SED-Staates,” Deutschland Archiv 10 (October 1992): 1019–30, and Fall der Mauer. See also Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

  76. The conduct of local elections in May 1989 was one such issue. Despite monitoring by opposition groups and reports of widespread abuses, election director Krenz declared that the proceedings had been “in order” and that the incumbent government had garnered 98.85 percent of the vote. See contemporaneous press coverage in the West in “Zeugnis der Reife,” Der Spiegel, May 15, 1989, 24–25. See also A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), which argues that “displays of self-satisfaction also seem to have played a key role in compounding the East German leadership’s inability to contend with the very specific challenges that were to haunt the GDR in the late 1980s” (178–79).

  77. Albert O. Hirschmann, “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History,” World Politics 45 (January 1993): 173–202. For more on the daily lives of East Germans, see Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005); Jeannette Z. Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in East Germany, 1971–1989 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

  78. Conversation between Gorbachev and Németh on March 3, 1989, reprinted in “The Political Transition in Hungary, 1989–90,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 12–13 (Fall–Winter 2001): 77.

  79. The opening was soon to become a violation of a 1969 treaty with the GDR forbidding the unauthorized passage of citizens of either country into third countries. For contemporary comment on its significance, see Günter Schabowski, Frank Sieren, and Ludwig Koehne, eds., Das Politbüro Ende eines Mythos: eine Befragung Günter Schabowskis (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, December 1990), 51; “Ich bin das Volk,” Der Spiegel, April 16, 1990, 90; “The Great Escape,” Time, September 25, 1989, 30.

  80. A contemporary journalistic report on the conditions in Hungary may be found in “Eine Zeit geht zu Ende,” Der Spiegel, September 4, 1989, 16–21.

  81. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 66.

  82. The Németh quotation can be found in Helmut Kohl, Kai Diekmann, and Ralf Georg Reuth, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Ullstein, 1996), 74, which is essentially an extended interview with Kohl. In it, the chancellor quotes Németh to Diekmann and Reuth; he also publishes a similar description in Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 922. Németh’s declaration of his intent to open the border to East Germans does not actually appear in the Bundeskanzleramt’s official summary of the conversation, only in Kohl’s various remarks; see documents 28 and 29 from August 25, 1989, in DESE, 377–82. On the five hundred million DM credit to Hungary, see “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Delors, Bonn, 5. Oktober 1989,” document 58, DESE, 443–47.

  83. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 68.

  84. “Verleihung der Stresemann-Medaille an den Außenminister der Republik Ungarn, Gyula Horn, in Mainz, Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Genscher, am 10.1.1990 (Auszüge),” document 1 in Auswärtiges Amt, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 64–65.

  85. “Information on the Security Situation in the CSSR,” memorandum, Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Interior, October 17, 1989, CWIHPPC, 5.

  86. On the negotiations, see “Gespräch des Ministerialdirigenten Duisberg mit dem Ständigen Vertreter der DDR, Neubauer, Bonn, 1 Oktober 1989,” document 51, DESE, 429–30; “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsidenten Adamec, 3. Oktober 1989,” document 55, DESE, 437; “Gespräche und Kontakte des Chefs des Bundeskanzleramtes Seiters und des Ministerialdirigenten Duisberg, 3–5 Okt. 1989,” document 56, DESE, 438–41; Richard Kiessler and Frank Elbe, Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), 34–41. In an interview in Wachtberg-Pech on June 2, 2009, Genscher recalled that his September 1989 talks with Shevardnadze in New York at the UN General Assembly meeting were crucial in producing agreement to let the embassy refugees leave. After the deal was struck, Genscher thought that he would ride on a train himself, but as he was leaving for Prague, East Berlin notified him that he did not have permission to do so. He sent lower-ranking diplomats on the trains instead as a result.

  87. These details come from Frank Elbe, phone conversations, June 10 and 11, 2009.

  88. See interview with a train passenger broadcast in episode 23 of the CNN Cold War video series; “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes Berlin (Ost), 2. Oktober 1989,” document 52, DESE, 430–32. Franz Bertele was on the train leaving from Warsaw. Bertele’s account accords well with that of Frank Elbe, in transit from Prague, on events such as the appearance of more refugees at stopping places along the transit route.

  89. I am grateful to Richard Kiessler for discussion of these events. The chancellery received the following report: “Nach Berichten von Reisenden gebe es erhebliche Menschenansammlungen entlang der Strecke.” “Gespräche und Kontake des Chefs des Bundeskanzleramtes Seiters und des Ministerialdirigenten Duisberg, 3–5 Okt. 1989,” document 56, DESE, 440. For reporting to Washington, DC, by the U.S. embassy in East Berlin, see “Amembassy Embberlin to Secstate Washdc,” October 4, 1989, in CWIHPPC.

  90. On October 9, the Politburo decided, in essence, that all of the property of those who had left the GDR should be confiscated; see the various papers on this subject prepared for the Politburo, J IV 2/2A/3245, SAPMO. I am also grateful to Frank Elbe for discussing these events in phone conversations on June 10 and 11, 2009.

  91. “Vorlage des Ministerialdirigenten Duisberg an Bundesminister Klein, Bonn, 2. Oktober 1989,” document 54, in DESE, 435–36.

  92. Much of the account ab
ove comes from Kiessler and Elbe, Ein runder Tisch, 42–44; see also Baker with DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy, 199.

  93. “Freedom Train,” Time, October 16, 1989, 40.

  94. “Из дневника А.С. Черняева,” October 5, 1989, МГ, 204.

  95. This comment is not in the version of the diary released by Gorbachev, cited above; rather, it appears in a translated copy of the same source and date in GC.

  96. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatschow, 11. Oktober 1989,” document 60, DESE, 449–50; “Телефонный разговор М.С. Горбачева с Г. Колем,” October 11, 1989, МГ, 220–22.

  97. In a singularly insipid move, the party-run media tried to suggest that some of the emigrants had been kidnapped. If so, they certainly looked happy about it. See the coverage of the emigration in the party newspaper, Neues Deutschland, in the months of September and October 1989.

  98. On the role of churches in the GDR, see Gary Lease, “Religion, the Churches, and the German ‘Revolution’ of November 1989,” German Politics 1 (August 1992): 264–73; Bernd Schäfer, Staat und katholische Kirche in der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999).

  99. Comments made by Bärbel Bohley in a radio broadcast on RIAS, October 12, 1989. A transcription of this interview is in the Stasi archive, SED-KL 5009, 32–34, Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (hereafter MfS), Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereafter BStU).

  100. “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretär Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost), den 20 Sept. 1989,” document 43, DESE, 409–10. See also “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretär Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost), den 22 Sept. 1989,” document 45, DESE, 413–16.

  101. Grabner, Heinze, and Pollack, Leipzig im Oktober, 150–51; Deutscher Bundestag, ed., Bundestag Report (Bonn: Bundestag, August 1, 1990), 47; “Von den Arbeitern verlassen,” Der Spiegel, November 27, 1989, 19.

  102. See the letters in IV 2/2.039/323 Büro Krenz, SAPMO.

  103. Schabowski, Sieren, and Koehne, Das Politbüro Ende eines Mythos, 113; SED Bezirksleitung, Leipzig, 20 30 30 10, 8 November 1989, in the Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Leipzig; Newsweek’s description of the November 4 demonstrations in “Egon, Here We Come,” Newsweek, November 13, 1989, 52.

  104. DDR Journal zur November Revolution August bis Dezember 1989, vom Ausreisen bis zum Einreißen der Mauer, a compilation produced by the Western newspaper taz, 1990, 73–75.

  105. In his study Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson observes the costs of elites failing to meet popular goals, arguing that “elite intransigence … always serves as an underlying cause of revolution,” and his insight aptly characterizes the East German episode. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 92.

  106. Der Spiegel estimated at the time that the number of “non-approved demonstrations” (the Stasi term for them) went from 24 involving 140,000 participants between October 16 and 22, to 210 involving 1.35 million between October 30 and November 5. See “Genosse, schlagen die uns tot?” Der Spiegel, April 30, 1990, 199.

  107. Ilse Spittmann, “Eine Übergangsgesellschaft,” Deutschland Archiv 22 (November 1989), 1204.

  108. For documents from and a detailed analysis of the events of November 9, see Hertle, Fall der Mauer, and his documentary film, When the Wall Came Tumbling Down, Sender Freies Berlin, 1999. See also Walter Süß, “Weltgeschichte in voller Absicht oder aus Versehen?” Das Parlament (November 9–16, 1990): 9; Hartmut Zimmermann, DDR Handbuch, 3rd ed. (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985), 975; for more general analysis, see Gesamtdeutsches Institut, Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, Analysen, Dokumentationen und Chronik zur Entwicklung in der DDR von September bis Dezember 1989 (Bonn: Bundesanstalt 1990), 86.

  109. “Schreiben von Gerhard Schürer an Egon Krenz, 27.10.1989: Zur Zahlungsunfähigkeit der DDR,” reprinted as document 8 in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 461. In the Soviet Union, Valentin Falin appears to have prepared a largely similar document: “An A.N. [Jakowlew], Zur Devisensituation in der UdSSR,” reprinted in German in Valentin Falin, Konflikte im Kreml: Zur Vorgeschichte der deutschen Einheit und Auflösung der Sowjetunion (Munich: Blessing Verlag, 1997), 289–93.

  110. Documents to this effect may be found in various locations. The East German version, available in J IV 2/2A/3255, ZPA-SED, SAPMO, has been reprinted as “Niederschrift des Gesprächs von Egon Krenz und Michail Gorbatschow am 01.11.1989 in Moskau,” document 9 in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 462–82. The Russian version is also available, translated in GC. See also the analysis of the GDR-USSR trading relationship in Randall W. Stone, Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 125. Philip Zelikow has argued that this conversation suggests that Gorbachev did have a plan for moving forward with East Germany; see his comments in Fred I. Greenstein and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Cold War Endgame: Report of a Conference, Center of International Studies Monograph Series No. 10 (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1997).

  111. Douglas J. MacEachin, CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Records versus the Charges: An Intelligence Monograph (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, May 1996), 8–9.

  112. Comments made on camera in, respectively, the CNN Cold War series and the documentary film When the Wall Came Tumbling Down.

  113. On this topic, see Sarotte “Elite Intransigence,” 270–87; relevant documents in Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Countdown zur deutschen Einheit: Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen 1987–1990 (Berlin: Dietz, 1996).

  114. Transcripts of the press conference exist in a number of versions. See, for example, Albrecht Hinze, “Versehentliche Zündung,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 9, 1990, 17; and Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 170–73 (other key documents from the same day may be found in Hertle as well). Hertle’s documentary film When the Wall Came Tumbling Down includes video from it; the Brokaw quotations come from the video. An English-language transcript appears in CWI-HPPC; however, in the paragraphs above I have produced my own translation, which is not identical to the CWIHPPC one. See also Cordt Schnibben, “‘Diesmal sterbe ich, Schwester,’” Der Spiegel, October 8, 1990, 107; Schabowski, Sieren, and Koehne, Das Politbüro Ende eines Mythos, 136.

  115. Hinze, “Versehentliche Zündung,” 17; Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 170–73. For more on the overall significance of this event, see Manfred Görtemaker, Unifying Germany, 1989–1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).

  116. For a study of media impact in a different era, see Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media and the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). For more on the Stasi and television, see Jochen Staadt, Tobias Voigt, and Stefan Wolle, Operation Fernsehen: Die Stasi und die Medien in Ost und West (Göttingen : Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2008).

  117. The Brokaw interview with Schabowski is reprinted in both English and German in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 173–74. Schabowski was in transit home afterward until 8:00 p.m. and did not know the consequences of what he had said until he received a phone call later that night. See Günter Schabowski, “Wie ich die Mauer öffnete,” Die Zeit, March 13, 2009, online. I am grateful to Sylvia Gneiser-Castonguay for drawing my attention to this Zeit article.

  118. Tagesthemen, November 11, 1989, ARD Video-Archiv Hamburg.

  119. “Kohl-Gorbachev Conversation,” June 12, 1989, notes by Anatoly Chernyaev, copied and translated in GC.

  120. John C. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent: The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 97.

  121. See “Berlin Border Guards Stun
ned by the News,” New York Times, November 10, 1989, A15.

  122. For more on the end of the practice of shooting border crossers, see the entry for April 3, 1989, on http://www.chronik.der.mauer.de.

  123. The account in the five paragraphs above comes largely from “Kontrollen eingestellt—nicht mehr in der Lage.—Punkt,” published transcript of an interview with Harald Jäger, in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 380–89; Gerhard Haase-Hindenberg and Harald Jäger, Der Mann, der die Mauer öffnete: Warum Oberstleutnant Harald Jäger den Befehl verweigerte und damit Weltgeschichte schrieb (Munich: Heyne, 2007), 194–201; comments, images, and analysis from Hertle’s documentary film When the Wall Came Tumbling Down.

  124. For more contemporary press coverage of the events, see “Einmal Ku’damm und zurück,” Der Morgen, November 11–12, 1989); “Eine friedliche Revolution,” Der Spiegel, November 13, 1989, 19. Der Spiegel described the situation at the border crossings as follows: “Die Grenzer blieben zunächst stur. Jeder, so belehrten sie die Menge, müsse sich zunächst bei der Volkspolizei ein Visum besorgen, sonst gehe hier nichts. … Dann geriet die Lage, wie so manches in der vergangenen Wochen, der SED außer Kontrolle. Plötzlich war die Grenze offen—für alle. Hunderte stürmten, nach flüchtiger Kontrolle ihrer Ausweise durchs uniformierte Personal, hinüber.” See also Christoph Links and Hannes Bahrmann, Wir sind das Volk (Berlin: Links, 1990), 91: “Die Grenzsoldaten sind kulant, stellen angesichts des enormen Ansturms und der unklaren Regelungen einfach jede Kontrolle ein. DDR-Bürger können völlig ungehindert hinüber und wieder zurück.”

  125. For more on Jäger’s experience that night, see Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer, 387–89; Haase-Hindenberg and Harald Jäger, Der Mann. See also the press discussion of the release of Jäger’s book: Lothar Heinke, “‘Macht den Schlagbaum auf!’” Tagesspiegel, November 8, 2007, online; Peter Pragal, “Der Druck auf die Ventile,” Berliner Zeitung, July 17, 2007, online.