1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 38

  126. The statistics in the above three paragraphs appear in “Information über die Entwicklung der Lage an den Grenzübergangstellen der Hauptstadt zu Westberlin sowie an den Grenzübergangsstellen der DDR zur BRD, Berlin, 10. November 1989,” Arbeitsbereich Mittig 30, 96–106, BStU.

  127. Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 232–40.

  128. “‘Ein Alleingang der DDR war politisch nicht denkbar und militärisch nicht vertretbar’: Gespräch mit Manfred Grätz,” in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 390–98; see also 230–40.

  129. “Opposition: DDR-Behörden von der Reisewelle überrollt,” Tagesspiegel, November 14, 1989, 4. Eventually the requirement was dropped; see Spittmann, “Eine Übergangsgesellschaft,” 1204.

  130. “DDR-Reisebüro beklagt Mangel an Devisen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 10, 1989, 4.

  131. Spittmann, “Eine Übergangsgesellschaft,” 1204.

  132. For more on changing Soviet attitudes toward military intervention, see Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Intervention, 1973–1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

  133. Anton W. DePorte, Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), was an example of that consensus. DePorte believed that the division of Germany and Europe was durable, because it solved the German problem in a way “that is now, and will probably remain, generally acceptable or at least tolerable to most Europeans.” He also found that the Soviet Union “is likely to maintain its strategic and political dominance over Eastern Europe” (243–44).

  134. The phrase “a good Cold War” belongs to William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945–2002 (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 2.

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

  1. François Mitterrand, Ma part de vérité: De la rupture à l’unité (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 20. Translation from David Bell, François Mitterrand (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 7–8. Daniel Kehlmann, Die Vermessung der Welt (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2005), 13. Published in English as Measuring the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).

  2. The significance of the East German street has been recognized by a number of scholars. Samuel F. Wells finds that the “central actors were the people of the German Democratic Republic who expressed an overwhelming desire to improve their political and economic condition and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who saw an opportunity to achieve rapid unification of his nation.” See Samuel F. Wells, The Helsinki Process and the Future of Europe (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1990). Charles Maier has written that it was the collective action of dissidents and the public, “no matter how hesitant at first, and how filled with doubts later,” that “impelled decisive accommodations or allowed new initiatives.” He continues that he is “not claiming heroism; but I am defending agency.” Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), xiv. Lothar Probst, “Zu wenig ‘wind of change’ im fernen Westen,” Deutschland Archiv (January 1994): 128–30, criticizes the Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice account for paying too little attention to East Germany: “Das revolutionäre Treiben auf den Straßen von Leipzig, Berlin und Rostock löste sich z.B. in dem Diskurs des Harvard-Historikers Philip Zelikow ganz in den gewohnten Bahnen der diplomatischen Strippenzieher auf, die hinter den Kulissen die eigentlichen Weichen für die deutsche Einheit gestellt hätten. Das Volk war in dieser Lesart eigentlich nur Manövriermasse im Spiel der führenden Politiker der Groß- und Mittelmächte und kam als eigenständig handelndes Subjekt nur am Rande vor, eine Sichtweise, die in der Diskussion u.a. von Konrad Jarausch (Univ. of NC) zu Recht wegen ihrer Einseitigkeit kritisiert wurde.”

  3. On the necessity for clearly defining terms, see Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, “Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations,” International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 34–43, especially 40.

  4. This definition obviously owes a debt to existing theories, such as Alexander Wendt’s claim that “the identities and interest of purposive actors are constructed by … shared ideas rather than given by nature.” Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–2, 20. Another useful concept comes from Charles Tilly. He sees “trust networks” as crucial to revolutions. Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 257.

  5. For more background on key actors and context, see Henry Ashby Turner Jr., Germany from Partition to Unification, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 175. I am also grateful to Jürgen Chrobog for a discussion of Genscher’s role.

  6. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit dem Vorsitzenden der Gewerkschaft ‘Solidarität,’ Wałęsa, Warschau, 9. November 1989,” document 76, DESE, 492–96. The summary prepared by Kohl’s staffers notes that the conversation took place from 6:05 to 7:00 p.m.

  7. Eduard Ackermann, Mit feinem Gehör: Vierzig Jahre in der Bonner Politik (Bergisch Gladbach: Lübbe Verlag, 1994), 310; Helmut Kohl, Kai Diekmann, and Ralf Georg Reuth, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Ullstein, 1996), 126–27; Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 14–16. See also Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” DESE, 54.

  8. A useful biographical summary of his life may be found at http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?key=&menu_sel=15&menu_sel2=38.

  9. There is some disagreement between Teltschik’s memoir written in 1991, and later comments by Kohl in 1996 and afterward, as to whether he wanted to go to Bonn or Berlin first. Kohl later said that he wanted to go to the “German capital,” a vague term because technically at that point there was no German capital, only a West German capital (Bonn) and an East German capital (East Berlin); see Kohl, Diekmann, and Reuth, Ich wollte, 128. The Teltschik account is more convincing because it was written closest to the time and provides extensive substantiating details. For more on the Kohl era generally, see Clay Clemens and William E. Paterson, eds., The Kohl Chancellorship (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

  10. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 103.

  11. Teltschik, 329 Tage, 18–19.

  12. The text of the public remarks is in “Vor dem Schöneberger Rathaus in Berlin am 10. November 1989,” in Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), 618–22. For behind-the-scenes details, see Kohl, Diekmann, and Reuth, Ich wollte, 132–33; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 19–20. Press reports from that evening (both written and video) are available in the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Pressearchiv (hereafter KASPA); see also the press reports delivered to James Baker, folder 11, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 103, say that the crowds were jubilant in front of the Schöneberger Rathaus—an accurate description earlier, but not the case when Kohl started speaking.

  13. “Auch für Herrn Kohl gilt: ‘Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben,’” taz, November 13, 1989, in KASPA. See also Harold James and Marla Stone, eds., When the Wall Came Down (New York: Routledge, 1992), 46.

  14. For more on the poll results and concepts of West German identity, see Andreas Rödder, Deutschland Einig Vaterland (Munich: Beck, 2009), chapter 4.

  15. “Mündliche Botschaft des Generalsekretärs Gorbatschow an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 10. November 1989,” document 80, DESE, 505. Copies of the similar messages that Gorbachev sent to Bush, Kohl, Mitterrand, and Thatcher were given to the SED, and are in DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319, SAPMO.

  16. In his own work on German unification, Charles Maier pointed out the following: “Speaking personally, since much of my work
as a twentieth-century historian has involved examining the pressures that lead to choices for submission, it has been exhilarating to focus this time on choices for freedom.” Maier, Dissolution, xv.

  17. Claudia Rusch, Meine freie deutsche Jugend (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2003), 35, 75.

  18. Note from J. Stapleton Roy to James A. Baker, November 9, 1989, folder 11, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP.

  19. Baker wrote this note on top of a press report from November 9; see folder 11, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP. For the original text of Bush’s Mainz speech, see “A Europe Whole and Free, Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz. President George Bush. Rheingoldhalle. Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989,” on the website of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, available at http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm.

  20. See in particular transcripts of Baker interviews, folder 34, box 160, series 11, BP.

  21. See the press reports, folder 11, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP. Bush’s biographer, Timothy Naftali, praises the president for his restraint; summarizing Bush and unification, Naftali concludes that “George H.W. Bush, for a moment at least, became a great president.” See Timothy Naftali, George H.W. Bush (New York: Times Books, 2007), chapter 4.

  22. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 105.

  23. For the Baker comments, see press reports, folder 11, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP. For more on the centrality of NATO to Washington’s thinking, see Frank Costigliola, “An ‘Arm around the Shoulder’: The United States, NATO, and German Reunification, 1989–90,” Central European History 3, no. 1 (1994): 87–110.

  24. Wörner had impressed Bush on a German visit in 1983, when the former was defense minister and the latter was vice president. Bush had seen the inner-German border for himself and then shared a long train ride with Wörner afterward, and the friendship stuck. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 184.

  25. Mitterrand’s remarks were broadcast in German on Tagesschau at 8:00 p.m. (ARD Videoarchiv) and reproduced in his memoirs in French: François Mitterrand, De l’Allemagne, de la France (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, April 1996), 201.

  26. Philip Zelikow, interview with author, July 27, 2008, phone conversation and subsequent emails.

  27. Fred I. Greenstein and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Cold War Endgame: Report of a Conference, Center of International Studies Monograph Series No. 10 (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1997), 7.

  28. I agree with Frédéric Bozo about this, although disagreements about the finer points of Mitterrand’s strategy will be developed in the text. See Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande: De Yalta à Maastricht (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005). For more on Franco-German relations, see Georges-Henri Soutou, L’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996).

  29. For an assessment of Bousquet, see Daniel Singer, “Death of a Collaborator,” The Nation, July 19, 1993, online.

  30. This paragraph draws heavily from David Bell, François Mitterrand (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005), see especially 165; Frédéric Bozo, “Mitterrand’s France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal,” Cold War History 7, no. 4 (2007): 457–59; Mitterrand, De l’Allemagne, which was published posthumously.

  31. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), 13, 132. See also Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997).

  32. Horst Teltschik, interview with author, June 13, 2008, phone conversation.

  33. Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 31.

  34. On Mitterrand and unification, see Tilo Schabert, Wie Weltgeschichte gemacht wird: Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002).

  35. Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 36, says that “suddenly, the Soviets received notice of the decision from the East German leadership just before it was announced to the public.” He cites a 1992 interview with Foreign Ministry officials as the source. This contradicts comments repeatedly made by Gorbachev that he received no information; see, for example, the on-air interview in the CNN Cold War television series, episode 23. The Foreign Ministry officials may have been overstating an earlier event, when they were advised of further updates to the misbegotten travel regulations; the East German foreign minister, Oskar Fischer, informed the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin, V. I. Kochemasov, that the SED was planning on liberalizing travel rules on November 7, 1989. Fischer explicitly stated that the border would not be opened, however (“Die Grenze DDR/BRD werde nicht geöffnet, weil sie unkontrollierbare Wirkung hätte”). See “Vermerk über ein Gespräch zwischen Genossen Oskar Fischer und dem sowjetischen Botschafter Genossen W. I. Kotschemassow am 7.11.989, 11.45 Uhr, Berlin,” DDR Staatsarchiv, DC20-4933; also reprinted as document 13 in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), 487–88.

  36. “Из дневника А.С. Черняева,” November 10, 1989, МГ, 246. Translated as “Notes of Anatoly Chernyaev,” November 10, 1989, in GC; GC translation used here.

  37. Gorbachev, Memoirs, 516.

  38. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, 10. November 1989,” document 82, DESE, 507; see the U.S. version of the same document, FOIA 1999-0393-F, BPL. On Geremek, see his obituary, written by Nichols Kulish, in the New York Times, July 14, 2008. For more on the Polish revolution, see Bernd Schäfer, “The Catholic Church and the Cold War’s End in Europe: Vatican Ostpolitik and Pope John Paul II,” in Europe and the End of the Cold War, ed. Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 64–77.

  39. “Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Mazowiecki, Warschau, 10. November 1989,” document 77, DESE, 498.

  40. Bernhard Kempen, Die deutsch-polnische Grenze nach der Friedensregelung des Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrages (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1997), 288, argues as follows: “Ungeachtet der Verpflichtungen, die der Bundesrepublik und der DDR aus den von ihnen mit Polen und der Sowjetunion abgeschlossenen Verträgen des Jahres 1970 erwachsen sind, hat sich an dem territorialen Status der Ostgebiete nach der Rechtslage von 1937 nichts geändert. Diese Gebiete sind aus der territorialen Souveränität des fortbestehenden deutschen Gesamtstaats zu keiner Zeit ausgegliedert worden. Es bestand kein Erwerbstitel zugunsten Polens und der Sowjetunion, als im Zuge der deutschen Vereinigung im Jahr 1990 grenzbezogenen Regelungen über die jenseits von Oder und Neiße gelegenen Gebiete getroffen worden sind.”

  41. Mazowiecki press conference, February 21, 1990, reported to Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council (hereafter NSC) PRS files, 1989–1900 [sic] subject file, 2 + 4—Germany #1 [2], CR00721-009, FOIA 2001-1166-F, BPL.

  42. The Margaret Thatcher Foundation has secured the release of a number of documents via FOI and posted them on its website, www.margaretthatcher.org. Papers produced by her domestic political advisors in late 1989, available on the site, express concern that she was focusing too much on foreign policy when she was in difficulty at home.

  43. John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher (London: Pimlico, 2004), 303.

  44. On this point, see Bozo, “Mitterrand’s France,” footnote 42; Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 383.

  45. Peter Heinacher, “Parteien ohne Konzept,” Handelsblatt, November 13, 1989, KASPA. See also Konrad Jarausch, Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen, 1945–95 (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 291.

  46. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Premierministerin Thatcher, 10. November 1989,” document 81, DESE, 505–6; November 10 Bush-Kohl conversation cited above in note 38. My request for the British CAB copy of the same document was approved in 2009:
Report entitled “East Germany,” from Charles Powell, 10 Downing Street, to J.S. Wall, FCO, November 10, 1989, released by CAB under FOI.

  47. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, 11. November 1989,” document 85, DESE, 511; “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatsratsvorsitzenden Krenz, 11. November 1989,” document 86, DESE, 513–15; “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatschow, 11. November 1989,” document 87, DESE, 515–17, also available as “Из телефонного разговора М.С. Горбачева с Г. Колем,” November 11, 1989, МГ, 247–50. The quotation is from Kohl’s version of the conversation.

  48. Teltschik, 329 Tage, 22–27.

  49. “Vorlage an Bundeskanzler Kohl, ohne Datum,” document 95, DESE, 548–49; “Schreiben des Bundesministers Waigel an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn, 10. November 1989,” document 84, DESE, 510–11.

  50. “Predigt des Bischofs von Oppeln (Opole), Alfons Nossel, während der Heiligen Messe, in Gegenwart von Bundeskanzler H. Kohl und Ministerpräsident T. Mazowiecki, Kreisau, 12. November 1989,” document 135 in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Bonn-Warschau 1945–1991 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1992), 498–501; Kohl, Diekmann, and Reuth, Ich wollte, 144–46.

  51. “Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Erklärung vom 14. November 1989,” in Auswärtiges Amt, Aussenpolitik, 623–31.

  52. Bush’s priority was clear: do not do anything that might provoke the Soviet Union. On this point, see Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” 57.

  53. Kohl had a series of briefing papers prepared for him the day before this dinner; see documents 94, 94a, and 94b, DESE, 541–48.

  54. “European Community Heads of Government Meeting in Paris 18 November,” summary sent by C. D. Powell, 10 Downing Street, to Stephen Wall, FCO, released by CAB under FOI; Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 984; Jacques Attali, C’était François Mitterrand (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 317, and Verbatim, Tome 3, Chronique des années 1988–1991 (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 342–45. The veracity of Attali’s memoirs has been challenged (see Bozo, “Mitterrand’s France,” 458), and Kohl’s memoirs also deviate from primary sources in parts, so neither source is entirely reliable, but they provide more details of the emotions of the event than the British summary.