1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Read online

  104. The text of Kohl’s comments at the February 10, 1990 Moscow press conference is reproduced in DESE, 812–13. See also GDE, 4:247; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 141–43.

  105. James A. Baker III, interview with author, February 11, 2009, Houston; Philip Zelikow, “NATO Expansion Wasn’t Ruled Out,” International Herald Tribune, August 10, 1995; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 182–87 (quotation from 187).

  106. For more on the origins and consequences of NATO enlargement, see Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 4–5; Gates, From the Shadows, 490; John Kornblum and Michael Mandelbaum, “NATO Expansion, a Decade On,” American Interest 3–5 (May–June 2008): 56–62; von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands, 244.

  107. The GDR delegation was still working on the assumptions from the Dresden meeting—that there would be movement toward a confederative structure, and that considerable aid would come from the West in the meantime. However, reports that Kohl was no longer interested in what had been discussed in Dresden made it to the delegation before the trip. See “Anlage, Ergebnisse der 12. Sitzung des Rundtischgesprächs am 12. Februar 1990,” in DA 3-12, and Ergänzung, DA 3-94, SAPMO. See also the round table preparations, ZRT-WD, 12. Sitzung, 703–20; GDE, 4:211.

  108. The former dissidents would campaign under the play-on-words slogan “Artikel 23: Kein Anschluß unter dieser Nummer,” but without success among the voters. For more on their campaign, see Andreas Rödder, Deutschland Einig Vaterland (Munich: Beck, 2009), chapter 4.

  109. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Modrow, Bonn, 13. Februar 1990,” document 177, DESE, 814–19; “Gespräch des Bundesministers Seiters mit den Ministern ohne Geschäftsbereich der DDR, Bonn, 13. Februar 1990,” document 178, DESE, 819–20; “Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Modrow, Bonn, 13. Februar 1990,” document 179, DESE, 821–26; “Positionen des RUNDEN TISCHES für die Verhand-lungen Modrow/Kohl am 13./14. Februar 1990,” Antrag 12/6, 12. Sitzung, 12.02.1990, in RHG, ZRT, Ordner 3.

  110. Thaysen, Der Runde Tisch, 16, 91; ZRT-WD, 10. Sitzung. See also “Beschluß der AG Sicherheit des ZRT zur weiteren Auflösung der Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung,” RHG, ZRT, 14. Sitzung, Ordner 4.

  111. A draft of the resolution is available in “Vorlage 13/14, 13. Sitzung, 19. Februar,” RHG, ZRT, Ordner 3; ZRT-WD, 13. Sitzung, 839.

  112. On the role that the vision of a third way played in the East German opposition movement, see Christof Geisel, Auf der Suche nach einem dritten Weg: Das politische Selbstverständnis der DDR-Opposition (Berlin: Links, October 2005). The concept of competing visions of modernity comes, as mentioned in the Introduction, note 14, from James C. Scott, as interpreted by Odd Arne Westad; see Odd Arne Westad, “Bernath Lecture: The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 551–65. In addition to its goal of devising a third way, the draft constitution that resulted also addressed the practicalities of designing a parliament and other law-giving bodies. For the sections of the draft containing information about the future parliament, see ZRT-WD, document 16/8, 5:679–711.

  113. ZRT-WD, 16. Sitzung, March 12, 1990, 1100.

  114. These sections of the draft constitution are in ZRT-WD, document 16/7, 5:673–78.

  115. “Arbeitsgruppe ‘Neue Verfassung der DDR’ des Runden Tisches, Brief an alle Abgeordneten, 04.04.1989,” RHG, ZRT, Ordner 9.

  116. The SED saved some in its archive (see citations below), although it is hard to know how complete the collection is. Nonetheless, it mirrors popular attitudes at the time.

  117. First two letters in DA 3-69, SAPMO, Briefe der Bevölkerung zur Wiedervereinigung, dated February 8 and 9, 1990. The names of the authors are deleted here, in compliance with German privacy laws for individuals who are not public figures, but are available at the archive. The last letter is anonymous, February 15, 1990, in DA 3-71, SAPMO.

  118. Also in DA 3-69, SAPMO, dated February 9, 1990 and February 13, 1990.

  119. DA 3-71, SAPMO, dated February 15, 1990.

  120. DA 3-71, SAPMO, dated February 2, 1990; anonymous, DA 3-69, undated, SAPMO.

  121. See Joachim Scholtyseck, Die Aussenpolitik der DDR (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), 45–46, which argues the following: “Immer klarer zeichnete sich ab, dass Gorbatschow seine politischen Visionen nicht einmal ansatzweise in die Tat umsetzen konnte.” See also the critical comments by Valentin Falin in an interview with David Pryce-Jones, reprinted in David Pryce-Jones, The Strange Death of the Soviet Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1995), 291.

  122. Jacques Lévesque argues in his The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 257, that “a somewhat slower transition in Prague and Berlin, which a more activist Soviet policy could have supported, would have allowed Gorbachev to better push ahead with his European policy. His prospects were excellent in the summer of 1989.”

  123. Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 57.

  124. I am grateful to Jan-Werner Müller for these insights. His forthcoming chapter in the Cambridge History of the Cold War on intellectuals and the end of the German division promises to be very interesting.

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

  1. Max Weber, Schriften zur Sozialgeschichte und Politik (Stuttgart: Reclam), 320. Translation from Peter Lassmann and Ronald Speirs, eds., Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 352. James Stevens Curl, Oxford Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 602. Michael Frayn, Democracy (New York: Faber and Faber, 2003), 86.

  2. On the elections, see Jürgen W. Falter, “Wahlen 1990: Die demokratische Legitimation für die deutsche Einheit mit großen Überraschungen,” in Die Gestaltung der deutschen Einheit, ed. Eckhard Jesse and Armin Mitter (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), 163–88. The process of institutional transfer took place throughout Eastern Europe and has become a field of study in its own right. One of the best studies is Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

  3. The definition of corporatism comes from Harold James, Europe Reborn: A History, 1914–2000 (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2003.)

  4. In this, Kohl was fulfilling the predictions of Eckart Kehr, author of Der Primat der Innenpolitik (Berlin: Gruyter, reprint 1970). For an overview of inner-German relations, see Heinrich Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer: Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990 (Berlin: Ullstein, 1999). See also Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 102–13.

  5. Acheson is cited in Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Grand Strategy for a Divided America,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (July–August 2007): 82.

  6. “Soviet Government Statement on Troop Withdrawal Pledge, 11 February 1990,” TASS, translated and reprinted in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War—Key Treaties, Agreements, Statements, and Speeches (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 477–78.

  7. See the calendars of Baker’s travel schedule for February 1990, available in BP; Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1997), 114; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 192. The trip, lasting February 5–13, included stops in Ireland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, and Canada; it was followed immediately by another trip to the Andean Drug Summit in Cartagena, Colombia. On attendance at the conference, see “Treffen der Außenminister der NATO und der Warschauer Vertragsorganisation in Ottawa (12.-14.2.1990),” in Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1990/91: Auf dem Weg zu e
iner europäischen Friedensordnung eine Dokumentation (Bonn: Auswärtiges Amt, April 1991), 64–65.

  8. See folder 11, box 176, 12b German unification, series 12, BP; Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 414.

  9. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, 13. Februar 1990,” document 180, DESE, 826–28.

  10. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 240–41. The letter, published in English, reads as follows: “In no event will we allow the Soviet Union to use the Four Power mechanism as an instrument to try to force you to create the kind of Germany Moscow might want, at the pace Moscow might prefer.” In “Schreiben des Präsidenten Bush an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 9. Februar 1990,” document 170, DESE, 784–85.

  11. “Executive Brief,” DCI, NIC, March 1, 1990, 3: “The Kremlin will continue to work directly with Bonn in talks we will not be fully privy to. It has few, if any, blandishments to offer, and its ability to threaten lacks credibility. Nonetheless, the Soviets are likely to try to make Bonn think there is a strong possibility they will refuse to remove their troops from East Germany unless their security concerns are fully addressed. Moscow probably would also back any popularlysupported move by a new East German government for a neutral East Germany, hoping this would stall intra-German discussion on the future alignment of Germany.” Released via FOIA.

  12. Memo by Valentin Falin, “An M.S. [Gorbatschow] (Zum geplanten Treffen mit Helmut Kohl),” reprinted in German in Valentin Falin, Konflikte im Kreml: Zur Vorgeschichte der deutschen Einheit und Auflösung der Sowjetunion (Munich: Blessing Verlag, 1997), 314–16; discussion in text, 154. Falin dates this document as March 1990, but given its title—for the planned meeting with Kohl—and content, it seems to be from February of that year.

  13. Memcon, the White House, “Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany,” February 13, 1990, 1:49 p.m., in FOIA 1999-0393-F, BPL; also available at the NSA and in CWIHPPC.

  14. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Sielder, 1995), 726.

  15. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, 13. Februar 1990,” 828. The phrase “non-starter” appears in English in quotation marks in the German version; the U.S. version merely has Bush saying that the “35 won’t work.”

  16. Memcon, the White House, “Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany,” February 13, 1990, 3:01–3:10 p.m. EST, in FOIA 1999-0393-F, BPL; also available at the NSA.

  17. “Prime Minister’s Meeting with the German Foreign Minister,” summarized by her private secretary, n.d., but document explains that Genscher was visiting on his way back from Ottawa, released by the FCO via FOI. The Italians, in particular, would complain about being excluded. “Interview with Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De Michelis, 15 February 1990,” in Freedman, Documents, 489.

  18. Genscher, Erinnerungen, 726; James A. Baker with Thomas A. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 214

  19. Dennis Ross, interview with author, November 17, 2008, Washington, DC.

  20. Baker with DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy, 215–16; “Statement by the Foreign Ministers Attending the ‘Open Skies’ Conference, Ottawa,” in Freedman, Documents, 480.

  21. Anatoly Chernyaev’s introduction to МГ, xix.

  22. Handwritten note from Baker to Gorbachev, March 28, 1990, folder 15, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP.

  23. “EUR Daily Press Guidances—February 14, 1990,” run by Margaret Tutwiler, in NSC, Wilson, FOIA 2001-1166-F, BPL. It is not clear who provided the answer cited above; not all of the commentators present were identified.

  24. Philip Zelikow, interview with author, July 27, 2008, phone conversation and subsequent emails; “В.В. Загладин о своей беседе с К. Райс,” February 12, 1990, МГ, 365–66. For more information on Zagladin, see his memoirs: Vadim Sagladin, Und Jetzt Welt-Innen Politik: Die Außenpolitik der Perestroika (Rosenheim: Horizonte, 1990).

  25. Report entitled “Germany and NATO,” from Charles Powell to Stephen Wall, February 10, 1990, released by CAB under FOI; and Briefing Papers, prepared by Security Policy Department, FCO, entitled “Nuclear Weapons on German Territory,” March 1, 1990, released by CAB under FOI. “Konstituierende Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik des Kabinettausschusses Deutsche Einheit, Bonn, 14. Feb. 1990,” document 182, DESE, 830–31; “Vermerk des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Kaestner, Bonn 15. Februar 1990,” document 184, DESE, 833–34. See also Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 103; Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” DESE, 111.

  26. Philip Zelikow, interview with author, July 27, 2008, phone conversation and subsequent emails. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 186–87; James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 15.

  27. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 243.

  28. Handwritten notes on side of “Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 90,” Condoleezza Rice, NSC, PRS files, FOIA 2001-1166-F, BPL.

  29. Szabo, Diplomacy, 59.

  30. For a detailed and insightful discussion of the conduct of the 2 + 4 talks in the context of German unification, see Andreas Rödder, Deutschland Einig Vaterland (Munich: Beck, 2009), chapter 5.

  31. The Thatcher quotation comes from a report entitled “German Unification: NATO and Security Aspects,” from C.D. Powell to J.S. Wall, March 5, 1990, released by CAB under FOI.

  32. “Memorandum for William Sittmann, From Philip Zelikow, Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom in Bermuda on April 13,” forwarded on May 3, 1990, available at www.margaretthatcher.org. Bush and Mitterrand met on April 19, 1990, in Key Largo. Just before the meeting, Bush sent a telegram to Mitterrand, summarizing what he wanted to discuss. This telegram duplicated nearly word-for-word the language used with Thatcher: “… the two plus four should not negotiate over Germany’s right to remain a full member of NATO; should not decide the fate of allied conventional or nuclear forces on the territory of the current FRG; should not agree on the future size of united Germany’s armed forces; and should not replace the old four power rights with new discriminatory limits on German sovereignty—a prescription for future instability.” Bush added that “NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe. If NATO is allowed to wither because it has no meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a long-term U.S. military commitment can die with it.” Telegram from White House to Elysée Palace, 17 April 1990, in 5 AG 4/EG 170, Archives Nationales, Paris; telegram in English language. The French Foreign Ministry interpreted this telegram as evidence of the German and American desire to reduce the role of the 2 + 4 to the absolute minimum: see “NOTE POUR LE DIRECTEUR,” Direction d’Europe, 17 April 1990, in 5 AG 4/CDM 36, dossier 2, Archives Nationales, Paris.

  33. All of the Baker quotations in the paragraphs above come from “Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President, Friday, February 16, 1990, 1:30pm,” with handwritten notes by Baker, folder 7, box 115, 8e White House meetings and notes, series 8, BP. See also Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 109–14.

  34. Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 1080.

  35. Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 159.

  36. On Polish questions, see letter from Charles Powell to Richard Gozney, FCO, February 23, 1990, released from CAB by FOI; “Schreiben des Ministerpräsident Mazowiecki an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Warschau, 30. Januar 1990,” document 154, DESE, 744–45; “Artikel von Prof. Dr. Krzystof Skubiszewski, Minister für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten de
r Republik Polen, in der Zeitschrift ‘Europa-Archiv,’ ‘Die völkerrechtliche und staatliche Einheit des deutschen Volkes und die Entwicklung in Europa,’ Bonn, 7. Februar 1990,” with postscript from March 25, 1990, document 137 in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Bonn-Warschau 1945–1991 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1992), 510–18. See also Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 353; report entitled “German Unification: The Role of the CSCE 35,” from J.S. Wall to C.D. Powell, February 19, 1990, released by CAB via FOI.

  37. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Camp David, 24. Feb. 1990,” document 192, DESE, 860–73, especially 863–64; Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990–1994 (Munich: Droemer, 2007), 36.

  38. See “Federal Chancellor Kohl on ‘The German Question and European Responsibility,’ Paris, 17 January 1990,” in Freedman, Documents, 416–17; “Speech by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister of Poland,” February 21, 1990, in Freedman, Documents, 488; “Vorlage des Regierungsdirektors Mertes und des Legationsrats I Hanz an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn, 27. Feb. 1990,” document 195, DESE, 878–79; see also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 215.

  39. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush,” DESE, 863.

  40. See Hutchings, American Diplomacy.

  41. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 253. The quotations in this book correspond closely to the documents that have been released, so presumably the quotations from unreleased documents, such as this one (the U.S. version of the Camp David meeting is not yet available in full) may be used with a high degree of confidence. For an analysis of this particular comment, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Economic Constraints and the Turn towards Superpower Cooperation in the 1980s,” in The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation, ed. Olav Njølstad (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 105–6.