1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Read online

  But despite this stab in the heart, the specter refused to die. The four powers were in frequent contact in late November, so they were well aware of each other’s concerns about the collapse of the wall. Bush was the most relaxed; the potential unification of Germany was not a sensitive issue for him. As he told New York Times journalist R. W. Apple, Jr., in October 1989 (acting on a request by Kohl that he make some public comment), the possibility of German unification did not worry him.63 “I must confess I did not feel that strongly about whether we should push the matter,” he commented in his memoirs later. Remarkably, he even said that if “the NSC or State Department had argued it was a bad idea, I certainly would have been receptive.” Yet because “I was not afraid of reunification, I probably set a different tone for the Administration on the issue than it might otherwise have had.” Bush did, indeed, set the tone, through a series of steps that indicated that he would let Kohl take the initiative. As Scowcroft recalls, “President Bush was the first in the administration to back reunification unequivocally.” The key event was a dinner in Laeken, Belgium, in December 1990, as will be described below.64

  In contrast to Bush, Thatcher had a firm opinion from the outset. Already upset by arms control initiatives begun under Reagan, she was not about to let the status quo dissolve further if she could do anything about it, and worked hard at getting this message out. CBS News aired footage of the British prime minister on November 10 saying “I think they’re going much too fast, much too fast.” On November 11, she and Baker, according to his notes, agreed “that immediate contacts among Four Powers in Berlin are approp[riate] 1 should be held w/out delay.” 65 In a speech in London’s Guildhall on November 13, scrutinized by the U.S. National Security Council, she painted a dramatic picture of the dangers of change: “We must remember that times of great change are times of great uncertainty and even danger.” 66 The Iron Lady also had a private message sent to Gorbachev, saying “I agree with you that the speed with which these changes are taking place carries its own risks of instability.” 67 And she took full advantage of an invitation to vent her feelings to Bush face-to-face at Camp David on November 24. The president said that he “was looking forward to the two of them putting their feet up at Camp David for a really good talk,” and that was what he got.68 Thatcher informed Bush that “there had been a consensus at the meeting of EC Heads of Government in Paris on 18 November that the issue of borders should not be raised.” Instead, the “first and overriding objective should be to see genuine democracy established throughout Eastern Europe and eventually the Soviet Union.” The implicit imperative was that unification would only take place after democratic regimes had emerged east of the iron curtain. She added that “reunification was not just a matter of self-determination: the Four Powers had certain responsibilities.” Thatcher emphasized the risks of rash action; should “Gorbachev be toppled” then “our larger vision of democracy in Eastern Europe [would] vanish.” 69

  In Washington, Baker had lunch on Sunday, November 12, with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, even though it was a holiday weekend. The ambassador emphasized the concerns that Gorbachev had already expressed. Baker noted his reply in his file for that date: “We said we understand [the] imp[ortance] of keeping order.” 70 At the top level, Bush and Gorbachev had already agreed to their first meeting, albeit a low-key one, in Malta at the start of December. Corresponding with Bush in advance, Gorbachev expressed his happiness at the timing of their meeting. “In the current critical period some particularly sensitive problems have arisen in the world which require that big powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States give them special attention and show extraordinary caution,” he wrote.71

  Meanwhile, on the ground in divided Germany, the chief of staff for the Western Group of Forces of the Soviet Union contacted his peers in the U.S., British, and French forces to ask for their help in maintaining order.72 On top of this, Gorbachev and Mitterrand spoke on the phone on November 14; according to Chernyaev, during the call Gorbachev expressed his satisfaction to Mitterrand that the Soviet Union and France had “a mutual understanding on this really cardinal issue.” Mitterrand said that “the French position is as follows: We would like to avoid any kind of disruption. … I do not think that the issue of changing borders can realistically be raised now—at least up until a certain time.” 73 As a result of these contacts and concerns, the notion of four-power collaboration refused to go away. It would reemerge after events on the ground and actions by Kohl meant that the United States could no longer resist the desire of its allies for such a meeting.

  CANDY, FRUIT, AND SEX

  Even as the head offices in capitals around the world buzzed with debate over what to do, the European streets continued to buzz with people. In the East, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution began unfolding in late November, and unrest grew in Romania. In the GDR itself, the size of protest marches actually increased after the wall opened; the Monday marches in Leipzig went from tens of thousands to a quarter million strong.74

  On the border to the West, people continued to flow over in a tidal wave. One million people crossed in the first few days alone. The mayor of West Berlin estimated that at any given time the population of his city was swollen by 200,000 or 300,000, stretching the capacity of the subways and infrastructure to its limits.75 Nine million people, representing a majority of the GDR’s population, crossed the borders in the first week. In the month of November, 130,000 decided to move to West Germany permanently.76 The locations that distributed the previously mentioned “welcome money”—a practice of handing out a hundred DM gratis to each East German, with more for families, instituted when the number that made it over was orders of magnitude smaller—were overwhelmed.

  Stores were swamped as well. A trend immediately became apparent that would continue to have an impact on unification: the lure of consumer goods. Earlier in the century, after wars had ravaged all of Europe, deprived consumers had hungered for U.S. wares.77 The iron curtain had largely cut the East off from high-quality American and Western goods. Now the East Germans, while not experiencing a war in the last decades, suddenly had their own opportunity to make up for that lack.

  Shops overflowed and West Germany’s normally strict closing hours were impossible to maintain. Candy and fruit proved to be especially popular—as did erotica, particularly that sold by sex shop entrepreneur Beate Uhse. She had long shown a flair for the dramatic, so she found the circumstances of 1989 congenial. Born in 1919 to a medical practitioner, Uhse had overcome all gender and other obstacles to her life’s goal: learning how to fly. She married her instructor and followed him into military aviation after he was called up in 1939. Rising to the level of captain in the Luftwaffe, she at one point personally flew their young son out of danger. Uhse survived the war, but her husband did not. Afterward, as a young widow, she faced a different kind of fire. She endured numerous lawsuits charging her with promoting fornication because she sold birth control to women who wanted to avoid pregnancy in the terrible conditions after the defeat.78 When better days dawned in the 1960s, Uhse branched out by launching a successful eponymous chain of adult stores.

  After the wall came down, Uhse had a stroke of genius: her sex shops began giving away her glossy catalog for free. This proved to be a savvy move. Long lines formed outside her stores as a result, and she gained hordes of loyal new fans. An obituary published on September 10, 2001, estimated that she had attracted two million customers in former East Germany.79

  Unlike Uhse, the West German stock market did not know how to react to the tidal wave of new consumers. At first, fueled by the promise of profits from all of those new buyers, it rose sharply. But it quickly gave up its gains because of increasing fears about what was to come.80 It was becoming clear to Western leaders that the GDR economy could not survive in its present state.81 What would happen when one of the most highly developed states in the world suddenly had to provide not only for new consumers but also for new infr
astructure? How would East Germans survive their sudden exposure to market conditions? What would happen to the entitlements they had come to expect under socialism?82 What would it cost the prosperous West? Was an avalanche of expenses about to overwhelm Western taxpayers?

  Worry was not limited to the West. The ruling regime in East Germany watched in horror as people and power flowed away from it. Continuous upheaval in the leadership ranks ensured that no one effectively headed the party during its biggest crisis. Eventually a reform-minded party leader from Dresden, Hans Modrow, emerged as the standard-bearer. He broke with decades of practice by emphasizing his government titles rather than his party ones. In other words, rather than being known as a party secretary, he preferred to go by the title of minister president, a government rank, thus confirming the erosion in value of the SED.83

  Meanwhile, the leaders of dissident and opposition groups bravely launched an attempt to fill the growing leadership void in the GDR. The most significant groups, working together with church leaders, decided that it was time to form a parallel body to the existing party and state structures. They sent out an invitation on November 24, 1989, calling for a Polish-style round table to begin—in other words, an ongoing meeting of both established and oppositional forces, as an interim means of ruling.84

  THE PORTUGALOV PUSH

  The ruling regime in East Berlin had fallen apart. The East German economy was melting down, and the end of the country’s ability to pay its debts was in sight. Spontaneous alternatives to state authority were emerging. There was discord among fellow EC and NATO members over what it all meant. There was disagreement even within West Germany over whether Bonn should push for unification or not. Spontaneous joy at the border opening was giving way to second thoughts. The FRG’s most prominent author, future Nobel laureate Günter Grass, raised the question of whether unity was morally permissible given the damage that the last iteration of a united Germany had inflicted on the world. West German philosopher Jürgen Habermas was also publicizing critiques of unification.85 In short, there was no obvious way forward.

  In the midst of these conditions, a catalyst appeared and produced the first clear West German model for order after the wall. Specifically, this catalyst walked into Teltschik’s office on Tuesday, November 21, in the person of chain-smoking Nikolai Portugalov, a not particularly high-ranking adviser to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Portugalov’s sense of irony—he would excuse his habitual note taking by saying, “I must report precisely and correctly to my superiors at all times,” while simultaneously rolling his eyes—appealed to Teltschik. Finding him to be a rather savvy character and appreciating his ability to speak German, Teltschik would seek out conversation with him on occasion as a source of information about Moscow. Given the dichotomous nature of Soviet leadership—there was a government, but it was the party hierarchy that really mattered—such party emissaries were an essential counterpoint to formal diplomatic contacts. And since government representatives would meet with their formal peers from the West German foreign ministry, headed by Teltschik’s archrival Genscher, meetings with Portugalov provided him with an independent means of gaining news from abroad.

  Portugalov said that he had a message for Kohl and handed Teltschik some handwritten pages, apologizing for the haste with which they had been translated. Teltschik did not care about the wording or poor penmanship, because he was “electrified” by what he read on them. One of the papers insisted that the hour had come to free both “West and East Germany from the relicts of the past.” It asked a “purely theoretical” leading question: Was West Germany preparing to talk about reunification or some kind of new unified entity? If so, then it was also time to talk about the procedures for exiting both NATO and the EC.

  For its part, “the Soviet Union was already thinking about all possible alternatives with regard to the German question, even the unthinkable.” The Soviet Union also wanted to know what West Germany would do about the need for a peace treaty. It might be willing to approve some kind of “German confederation” as long as Germans agreed that they would never again have foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.

  Presumably to provide deniability, this sensational message carried the title “Unofficial Position.” It was, however, accompanied by an “Official Position,” which Portugalov assured Teltschik had the approval of both Chernyaev and Valentin Falin, the leading German expert within the party.86 While not as breathtakingly blunt as the unofficial version, the official one nonetheless called for the construction of a new “all-European order of peace.” 87

  Teltschik was astonished. If senior Soviet leaders were already, less than two weeks after the wall opened, thinking about the long-term consequences of German confederation or even unification, including an exit from NATO and the EC, then it was high time that Bonn started doing the same. Portugalov had given an enormous push to Teltschik and by extension Kohl.

  What remains in dispute is the extent to which Portugalov’s messages reflected the actual thinking in Moscow at the time. Portugalov did not explicitly claim that he had Gorbachev’s approval, only that of Chernyaev and Falin. Both Chernyaev and Falin distanced themselves from Portugalov later; Chernyaev said that Portugalov presented himself and his messages as more important than they actually were.88 There may also have been an unintentional misunderstanding due to the rushed translation. Zelikow and Rice think that this might have been a case of Teltschik hearing “selectively” what he wanted. Teltschik, though, maintains that he understood Portugalov perfectly well: the highest level in Moscow was coming up with potential models for order in Europe. The race was on to define the future. It was clear that Teltschik could present these messages to the chancellor as a catalyst for change as soon as the meeting ended.89

  Teltschik could only catch Kohl briefly after Portugalov left, but Kohl agreed that decisive action was needed because “the unbelievable was starting to happen.” Portugalov’s memo seemed to fit well with a message that Bonn had received from Shevardnadze, suggesting that peaceful change was welcome. Kohl felt that he should try to talk to Gorbachev in person as soon as possible, and that in the meantime, Bonn needed to develop its own concept for the future.

  By Thursday, November 23, just two days later, Kohl and Teltschik had agreed that the chancellor should announce a model for achieving German unity to the Bundestag as soon as possible. A small team set to work on drawing up blueprints for one. By Saturday afternoon, a “Ten-Point-Program” was ready; a driver took it to Kohl at his home in Ludwigshafen, where he discussed it with trusted hometown friends and his wife. Kohl decided that he would present it to the world that Tuesday, November 28, as part of the Bundestag’s scheduled budget debate, which seemed like the earliest suitable opportunity.90

  Like Gorbachev’s initiative, Kohl’s model reflected older political formations, but the goal of the latter model was to adapt, not restore. Kohl advocated revivalism, already defined as the adaptive reuse of a previous style—that is, taking an out-of-date model, but altering and updating it for modern conditions, thereby building something new with older roots.91 The model he and his team chose to adapt (although they did not acknowledge it explicitly in public since references to the German past were always fraught with difficulty) was the concept of Germany as a national space with multiple states within it—in other words, a confederation. This idea had never disappeared from German political life. Brandt and his advisers had often talked of two states in one nation during their time in office in the 1960s and 1970s.92 And viewed historically, the German-speaking peoples had existed as a loose national grouping of individually governed political units for a number of centuries. In the nineteenth century, particularly powerful regions—most notably Prussia—were much stronger than the loose grouping of the whole. Indeed, the existence of one unified German nation-state was actually a bit of an anomaly, a recent invention achieved by the wars and skills of Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1871. His success turned the
King of Prussia into Emperor, or Kaiser, Wilhelm I. But Bismarck’s empire, meant to last for the ages, would be disassembled just seventy-four years later at the end of Hitler’s war, and Germany would return to a fractured state.93

  To be sure, there would be differences between what Kohl wanted to do and what had come before. Instead of hundreds of principalities as in previous centuries, there would only be two, West and East Germany. Instead of using confederation as a rhetorical strategy, as Brandt had done, Kohl wanted to use it as a practical goal that would guide the construction of both tangible and intangible new confederative structures. Instead of seeing the confederative state as permanent, the ultimate goal would be unity. But the basic idea was the same: beneath an overarching sense of shared Germanic culture, identity, language, and nationality, there would be for some length of time discrete political entities with their own governments.

  Kohl and his advisers envisioned this situation as lasting for quite a while, since at this point they thought that too rapid of a unification process would over-whelm West Germany. While the necessary confederative structures were under construction, the Ten-Point-Program would provide immediate aid to shore up the East German economy and stop the tide of refugees. All of this would take place in a manner consistent with the principles of the EC and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a convention signed by both superpowers and nearly all of Europe. “The future architecture of Germany must fit in the future pan-European architecture,” stated the Ten-Point-Program clearly.