1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Read online

  The discussion turned to how to convince other members of NATO to agree. Since Wörner was clearly reliable, he could once again be used as an intermediary to European leaders (and he would also go to Moscow right afterward to convince Gorbachev of the merits of the new NATO).122 As usual, Thatcher needed persuading. She was concerned that these reforms could dilute NATO’s effectiveness. Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Seitz used an Oscar Wilde quotation to describe how Thatcher thought about the Yanks: Wilde’s motto was that anything worth doing was worth overdoing, and Thatcher thought that this described Americans perfectly, so she would need reassuring that they would not overdo reform.

  Baker suggested that the real future risk to NATO might come from the CSCE, or to be more precise, French notions of building a new security structure around it. Baker’s comments were meant to suggest that decisive leadership of NATO now would ensure that the U.S.-led security organization would maintain its significance in the post–Cold War world.123 Bush asked, “do [the] French really want to see us out of there?” Baker replied that the French did not exactly want Americans to disappear entirely, they would just prefer if they could become mercenaries, available for hire only when needed. Zoellick pointed out that Mitterrand also wanted assurances that NATO would not go “out-of-area.” Cheney interjected that there needed to be a “rethink” of what was “out-of-area.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell joined the conversation at this point and spelled out the practical impact that the proposed reforms would have on NATO war planning. Powell did not anticipate one immediate consequence: Mitterrand, annoyed at the success of Washington in promoting NATO as the post–Cold War security alliance in place of a European confederation, would soon show his pique by pulling fifty thousand troops out of Germany and resisting the formation of multinational units.124

  The meeting concluded with agreement on the basic goal: to provide some kind of sense of security and perhaps even structure for the East once its international institutions—such as the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—collapsed around it. It was also essential to provide a “halfway house” for East Europeans, to enable them to participate in a united Europe.125

  The NATO summit began just after the July 4 holiday weekend. In London, the United States and West Germany succeeded in getting the approval of the alliance’s members for their communiqué with hardly any changes. The press release proclaimed NATO to be “the most successful defensive alliance in history.” The West Germans had added a sentence to the original U.S. draft saying that “a united Germany in the Atlantic alliance … will be an indispensable factor of stability,” and it appeared in the final version verbatim. NATO promised that it would never “be the first to use force” and that reliance on nuclear weapons in planning for Europe’s defense would be reduced. The West Germans got their joint declaration with the Warsaw Pact, but invitations to visit and establish permanent diplomatic missions were extended to individual member states, not the pact as a whole. The document also called for the CFE talks to go into “continuous session.” A long section on the importance of the CSCE appeared at the close.126 All of these provisions (and more) originated either in the first U.S. draft or subsequent West German edited versions; clearly, where Bonn and Washington led, NATO followed.

  The sense of cooperation was reportedly marred only in trivial ways—namely, by ongoing sniping between Kohl and Thatcher. The West German and English football teams had faced each other in the semifinal round of the World Cup on July 4, and the FRG had won. Kohl gloated that the Germans had beat the English at their national game; Thatcher shot back that the English had beaten the Germans at theirs twice in the twentieth century.

  Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe, there was sniping at the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well, which had started on July 2. In the course of it, Gorbachev’s opponent Yeltsin, along with the mayor of Leningrad, Anatoly Sobchak, resigned from the party altogether and formed a new opposition group. Conservatives within the party mounted a challenge too. Despite fierce attacks, Gorbachev was able to win a vote to stay on as general secretary of the party.127 Once the NATO summit got rolling, the news of its communiqué and planned reforms also helped. Shevardnadze would later thank Baker for getting the press release approved during the congress, saying it had enabled him and Gorbachev to defeat their enemies. The Soviet president emerged from the congress feeling, despite all of the setbacks, triumphant. Although he did not know it at the time, this was not much of a victory. His power would do nothing but continually erode afterward, hitting bottom with the coup in 1991.128

  Kohl and Teltschik were on a roll, but they were also tired, given that they were facing four summits in as many weeks. First they had gone to the final EC summit in Ireland at the end of June. This meeting served to reinforce what had already been decided in April—that the member states supported German monetary union and, after that, unification. Kohl had also continued his efforts to get his allies to provide substantial loans and credits to Gorbachev, without success. The British foreign secretary, Hurd, summed up Western thinking when he said that “one doesn’t help his friends by throwing a great deal of money down a hole.” 129

  Then, following the successful rollout of the Western DM into East Germany on July 1, Kohl and Teltschik were in London for the NATO summit (July 5–6). They were cheered by the fact that the West German soccer team, after defeating England, went on to win the entire World Cup on July 8, 1990; but there was not much time for celebrating: next was a trip to Houston, for a meeting of the G-7 (July 9–11), Kohl’s third visit to the United States in three months. In his memoirs, Teltschik remembered that his tie became an “instrument of torture” as the temperature of the Texas summer rose to 40 degrees Celsius, or 104 degrees Fahrenheit. He thought that the combination of “extreme” security and strict adherence to protocol inhibited actual work on the issues at hand by keeping even trusted aides away from the action and leaving little flexibility. Kohl did manage to get Bush to agree on a future Bundeswehr of 370,000 troops. But Kohl failed again to get others to support Gorbachev with major financial credits. At least he was clear on the fact that it would be up to him alone to provide such funding as he readied himself for his July 14 departure for the Soviet Union.130

  BREAKTHROUGH IN RUSSIA

  Late in the afternoon of that day, a Saturday, Kohl, his delegation, and an enormous number of journalists climbed into two Boeing 707s at Cologne Airport for their fateful weekend journey to Moscow.131 Over dinner on board, the group speculated that this was possibly the most important foreign trip the chancellor had ever taken. The nervous energy on board erupted into a fight, sparked by the long-standing tensions between Kohl’s and Genscher’s aides. Kohl stated that in the venue of the CFE multilateral disarmament talks, he would offer to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr to 400,000 troops (having already agreed with Bush that he would go no lower than 370,000). Doing so in the CFE Vienna talks was meant to avoid singling West German forces out within NATO for special reductions, creating an awkward precedent.

  Genscher argued for going lower, to 350,000. Kohl, unhappy with Genscher’s number, insulted his foreign minister by accusing him of trying to turn the Bundeswehr into a professional army on the sly. Genscher was horrified, saying there was absolutely no one in his party who wanted that. In the country that produced the Nazi horrors of World War II, it was an article of faith that the draft would keep the country’s military anchored in society and repress extremist tendencies.132 By the time the dust had settled, it was apparent that a compromise at 370,000 was possible; but nerves were obviously on edge.

  Shevardnadze met the plane personally as it landed at Vnukovo airport on Saturday night. He greeted the group warmly, which seemed to bode well. As the motorcade made its way downtown, Shevardnadze called for it to stop on the hillside from which Napoleon had watched Moscow burn. Teltschik remembers that the lights of the city reflected brightly off the st
reets, wet from a fresh rain. The view testified to Moscow’s ability to endure whatever came its way.

  After arriving at their guesthouse, the West Germans and their hosts enjoyed caviar and vodka together. Teltschik received a message for Kohl from Wörner, who had visited town earlier that day, saying that Gorbachev was pleased with the results of the London NATO summit. Gorbachev was also clearly happy that he had survived vicious attacks at the party congress. Surveying the convivial scenes at the table, Kohl had a strong sense that his meeting with Gorbachev the next morning would go well. He also knew a secret: although the five billion DM credit that had so thrilled Gorbachev was only recently finalized, Kohl learned just before leaving for Moscow that it had already been used up. Gorbachev was going to need another credit, and that would be to Kohl’s advantage.133

  Falin seems to have known this as well. Even as Kohl and his entourage were making merry, Falin tried one last-ditch effort to convince Gorbachev that he was being too conciliatory. He sent the Soviet leader a briefing paper, urging the hardest possible line and using whatever leverage the Soviet Union had left. Gorbachev should say that an overly ambitious plan for unification could not possibly be ratified by the Soviet Union. He should also say that if the West wanted to keep nuclear weapons in the FRG, then the Soviet Union would have to have a nuclear presence in the East as well. Falin had no idea whether or not Gorbachev would actually read this briefing paper, so he followed up with a number of phone messages. The Soviet leader finally called Falin back just before midnight, ten hours before the meetings with Kohl were to begin. Falin argued vehemently that West Germany was carrying out an Anschluss and Gorbachev should resist. Gorbachev was only moderately interested in the complaints of his untrustworthy adviser, however, and Falin made little headway.134

  On the following morning, a Sunday, Kohl, Teltschik, and others went to the guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The critical initial session with Gorbachev, Chernyaev, and their translator would take place there. The chancellor and his aide would have about two hours alone with Gorbachev and his adviser before the rest of their delegations joined them. Meanwhile, Genscher and Shevardnadze as well as Finance Minister Waigel and his Soviet counterpart would meet at the same time and in the same building, but in different rooms.135

  Gorbachev opened with reminiscences about World War II, and how much the world had changed to bring Kohl to Moscow. They agreed that their generation now had a chance to reshape the world. Kohl congratulated Gorbachev on surviving his “ride on the tiger” as he tried to reshape the Communist Party; Gorbachev agreed that it was a challenge. Trying to move from generalities to practicalities, Kohl again offered to sign a wide-ranging bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, as he had signaled in correspondence before the conference. It had to be before the German elections at the end of the year, Kohl insisted, because he was not sure what kind of authority he would have after them.136 This theme was one Kohl would use often throughout his visit: deal with me, because you don’t know what comes next. Kohl was, of course, trying hard to do the same himself, since he did not know what would come after Gorbachev.

  The Soviet leader then revealed that he had thought quite a lot about a treaty, because he handed Kohl a draft of what it might contain: a nonaggression pact, and “compensation to the citizens of the USSR who were forced into labor during the Second World War in Germany.” 137 Gorbachev also brought up the uncertainty in the GDR about how long economic recovery would take. He joked that Kohl was experiencing “his own perestroika.” 138

  Ignoring the draft treaty, Kohl kept emphasizing practicalities. He recalled the five billion DM in credit that he had organized and the concessions that had been made to maintain GDR-Soviet trade after monetary union. Kohl then explained what he needed: a plan for Soviet troop withdrawal and agreement that a united Germany could enter NATO. In return, he would be willing to talk about future limits on the size of the Bundeswehr as well as economic relations between the FRG and Soviet Union.

  Gorbachev initially responded that military leaders and journalists were already howling that he was selling the Soviet gains in World War II for DM; but he was finally ready to talk about specifics, and tell Kohl what he needed.139 First, the two of them had to agree that a united Germany would consist of the current FRG, GDR, and Berlin; in other words, it would stay within its current borders, so Poland would have no cause for alarm. Kohl concurred. Second, a united Germany could never have its own atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Kohl said that his position was clear, as he was already on the record as agreeing with this. Then, with studied casualness, Gorbachev slipped in what sounded like the long hoped-for concession in a way that downplayed it. Without explicitly saying that Germany could join NATO, he simply proceeded to the details. He announced that, third, “NATO’s structures” could not extend to what was now East Germany, and Soviet troops would remain there for a transitional period. Kohl asked whether this meant Germany would be fully sovereign, and Gorbachev confirmed that it would.140

  Teltschik was scribbling furiously to make sure he had the translation down precisely. He knew these were the crucial minutes and wanted to make sure that he had every word right.141 Outwardly, everyone kept their cool, but it was apparent that a breakthrough was in the offing. Kohl tried to clarify what had just transpired and asked whether Gorbachev meant that NATO’s jurisdiction could spread to the GDR after Soviet troops left. Gorbachev answered somewhat indirectly, saying that “the united Germany will be a member of NATO.” While Germany might belong to NATO de jure, however, “de facto it must look like the territory of the GDR does not come under NATO jurisdiction as long as Soviet troops are there.” The two leaders then discussed how long the Soviet troops could stay, and agreed on three to four years.142

  Kohl notes in his memoirs, although it does not appear in the official transcript, that at this point he pushed Gorbachev even further, asking for a clear statement that a united, sovereign Germany would belong to NATO; but he did not get one.143 Instead, Gorbachev responded with a cryptic remark that does appear in the official transcripts: he recommended that the chancellor come with him to Stavropol to talk further, saying that it would “be possible to think more clearly” in the fresh mountain air.144 Kohl was in the mood for a showdown, though. He threatened to break off his trip right then and there, and not go to the Caucasus at all, because he saw little point in doing so without clear agreement. He looked right at Gorbachev and said that he would only go to Stavropol if he knew that at the end, a united Germany could be in NATO. Gorbachev repeated that he should come to the Caucasus. At that moment, Kohl recalls, he knew that he had his breakthrough.145

  When Gorbachev’s and Kohl’s delegations joined them shortly thereafter, Kohl announced to the assembled group that “at the end of the year, according to everything that we know now and plan to do, Germany will reunify.” 146 The group enjoyed a lavish lunch together to celebrate, complete with more vodka. Even as he was eating, however, Kohl was considering how to ensure that what he had just achieved did not slip away. Once again, using his old and proven method of publicizing an agreement as soon as it was reached to legitimate it, solidify it, and make it difficult to reverse, Kohl pressed for a quick and unscheduled press conference. He was uncertain about how rapidly journalists could report from the mountain villages where they were going, so he wanted to get the message out while they were all still in Moscow, with better communications technology. The Soviets agreed, and a press conference was held on short notice. Gorbachev announced that NATO issues were in flux. Kohl told journalists that he was now optimistic that the 2 + 4 talks would wrap up soon and German unity could be achieved within the year.147

  After the press event, the delegations took a two-hour flight to humid Stavropol, about a thousand miles south of Moscow. Gorbachev took the West Germans on a tour of his old hometown, where he had worked as secretary of the Stavropol city party organization when he and Raisa were first married and sharing an apartment with
a dozen other people years ago.148 Nazi Germany had occupied the city from August 1942 until January 1943, and as a gesture of reconciliation, Kohl went with Gorbachev to a war memorial to lay a wreath. While looking on, Genscher mingled with a crowd of aging veterans who had assembled to watch. Their common desire seemed clear to him: they had not forgotten the brutal past but wanted to move forward into the future together with the Germans.

  The senior members of both delegations then went onward by helicopter and finally car to the mountain village of Archys. As promised, the air was indeed much clearer, and the views were lovely. Local farm girls formed a welcoming party, and handed bread and salt to Gorbachev and Kohl as they arrived. Waigel remembers that the welcome, even though staged, was nonetheless extremely moving in its beauty, hospitality, and simplicity. Genscher once again had the same feeling as he had had with the veterans: it was as if a door to the future was being opened.149 The mood was one of happy optimism, Teltschik recalls, as they walked by a nearby river in the evening.

  Still, there were hints of trouble ahead. Waigel, making small talk, commented on the agricultural bounty of the region and asked about the absence of barns, assuming that the harvest was transported by truck elsewhere for storage. He was shocked to learn that there were neither sufficient barns nor trucks anywhere in the region, and most of the harvest was simply left in the open to rot; it impressed on him how far the Soviet Union had to go.150